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ABSTRACT
K. ELIZABETH COGGINS: The Liberal Paradox.
(Under the direction of James Stimson)
How can liberal policy programs remain widely supported and liberal politicians con-
tinue to win elections when the liberal identity itself is out-favored by the conservative
identity at a margin of nearly two-to-one? This dissertation attempts to provide novel in-
sight to explain this central paradox of American politics. I begin by building a theory
of ideological identification formation at the micro level, drawing from recent findings in
psychology, and also considering the powerful agency of the environment in which individ-
uals form attachments. In the second empirical chapter, I return the 1960s, using content
analysis to recount the most dramatic shift in ideological identification in history. This
endeavor uncovers the birth of the core symbolic meaning of “liberal” that still lives on to-
day, and highlights the central role of the media in shaping individuals’ affects for liberals.
Likewise, on the heels of theses new connotations, liberal elites abandoned the label as a
definition for themselves and their policies, despite clear ideological connections. Finally,
in the third empirical chapter, I trace the media’s presentation of “liberal” to the mass pub-
lic as a function of moral symbols and rhetoric. My findings suggest that the liberal label,
once vacant of meaning, gained substantial substance in the 1960s, and that bundle of im-
ages, groups, and characteristics have become evermore central to the label. Furthermore,
I demonstrate that the moral language with which elites and the media color the liberal
identity has been typically less appealing to self-identified liberals and those predisposed
to identify as liberals. These findings offer new insight for understanding the persistence
of the unpopularity of liberal in name, yet broad acceptance in substance.
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For my mother, and hers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
“Liberal,” in the 21st Century America is an unpopular term. It has been unpopular for
decades. Liberal candidates diligently avoid the label. And their opponents diligently tag
them with it. To be called as a liberal, everyone understands, is to be called out as one.
This dissertation endeavors to understand why. If liberalism itself—the set of public
policies and proposals for policies—were equally unpopular, the story would be easy. But
ordinary Americans are consistent and insistent supporters of liberalism as policy.1 So-
cial Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, regulation of the workplace, progressive
income taxes, minimum wages, and a litany of other welfare state programs which have
made life better for ordinary working people all enjoy massive support. Mostly they go
unchallenged because conservative opponents understand that they are off limits. Since the
symbol is unpopular while its substance is revered, it is obvious that the two have become
divorced, that “liberal” as symbol has come to mean something different from its policy
achievements.
To make sense of that divorce, I believe it is necessary to understand how particular
symbols rise or fall as associations with ideological labels in the public mind. This pro-
cess begins at the individual level, specifically individual-level ideological identification
development—how images, experiences, and symbols get tied to terms like “liberal” and
“conservative”—shaping the meaning that individuals bring to them. This conception illu-
minates the long-lasting impact that historical events can have on ideological identification.
A detailed theoretical account of the process by which individuals fill a political symbol
1The term “liberalism” is used to describe the policies that liberals themselves have traditionally ascribed
to. As such, “liberal” and “liberalism” are used congruently here.
with meaning is offered in the first empirical chapter. It brings together a diverse set of
ideas offered by political scientists (Conover and Feldman 1981), psychologists (Jost and
Sulloway 2003), and moral psychologists (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009). In particular, I
suggest that identities are manifestations of citizens’ inherent psychological predispositions
and the environments they encounter. Personality and moral sensibilities drive individuals
to be attracted to certain symbols, and their affects for the symbols of “liberal” and “con-
servative” inform their ideological attachments. The environment, however, determines the
salience—the availability and accessibility—of symbols for citizens to evaluate.
Central to the findings of the first empirical chapter is that the symbols of liberal, at
least in the modern era, are symbols of change (consistent with the findings of Conover and
Feldman (1981) and Zschirnt (2011)), most notably those linked with marginalized groups
in society. For many Americans, “liberal” is unpopular in part because of the company it
keeps.
But the theory of ideological identification formation also suggests that the environ-
ment in which these identities are forged plays a critical role. That is, predispositions do
not work alone in ideological identification formation. Environmental forces such as the
media, political elites, and political rhetoric heavily influence these attachments because
they dictate what symbols are available and how they get framed for public consumption.
Framing—how individuals organize and perceive symbols—plays a central role in deter-
mining ideological identifications.
This final component, framing, lends a crucial piece: it helps explain how and why
changes in ideological identification may occur, especially swift and dramatic ones. Thus,
framing is a critical piece of my theoretical framework: it links the micro level story of
ideological identification formation to the macro level story of ideological identification
change. Without this link, two disparate stories exist: in one, we can explain how identities
are formed (as the product of symbols and predispositions); in the other, we observe macro
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level changes and develop logical, yet employ time-sensitive explanations for such change.
But, weaving in the story of framing creates an avenue for pulling the stories together,
employing individual level theory to understand how and why macro level changes occur.
In the second empirical chapter, I return to the 1960s, using a newly developed ide-
ological identification series (Ellis and Stimson 2012) to pinpoint the most critical shift
in ideological identification in U.S. history. Content analysis of The New York Times and
Newsweek provides compelling evidence that the media’s presentation of the race riots,
and crime and race more generally, became inextricably linked to the liberal identity—a
message that the public received loud and clear. This racialization is strongly supported
by ANES correlational analyses. At the same time, liberal elites ceased to identify with
the label or characterize their policies as “liberal.” More broadly, the message of the sec-
ond chapter is that media’s framing of the liberal label left an indelible mark on the liberal
identity.
Lastly, in the final empirical chapter, I consider a more complete series of ideological
identification, linking the 1960s with modern times. I collect every front page story of The
New York Times from 1960-2000 that mentions “liberal,” and analyze the overtime presen-
tation of the liberal label to the American people. By tracing the use of moral foundations
rhetoric and symbols alongside “liberal”—the first analysis to consider the overtime sig-
nificance of moral foundations—I discover that the packaging of the liberal label is rarely
appealing to liberals themselves. In fact, in only one year for the entire 40 year series does
“appealing” rhetoric surrounding liberal supersede less appealing language. This finding is
pivotal to understanding the persistent unpopularity of “liberal” in name.
Taken together, the chief contributions of this dissertation are this: (1) a novel structur-
ing of existing pieces for a more complete framework for ideological identification forma-
tion and maintenance, (2) evidence that the persistent symbols of “liberal” are symbols of
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race, marginalized groups, and change, (3) an explanation for the largest shift in ideologi-
cal identification in history, (4) a demonstration that the symbols of “liberal” were largely
born in the 1960s, (5) affirmation of the capacity of the media in shaping what symbols
are salient in the minds of citizens, and finally (6) that the framing of those symbols is a
powerful contributor to how citizens ultimately identify ideologically.
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2 ON THE ORIGINS AND MAINTENANCE OF IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATIONS AT THE MICRO LEVEL
This project is motivated by a simple observation: the modern-day dearth of liberal
identifiers in the United States. In 2012, more than a dozen polling agencies, includ-
ing well-respected institutions like Gallup, The New York Times/CBS, American National
Election Studies, NBC/Associated Press, and Pew Research Center found that conservative
identifiers outweigh liberal identifiers nearly two to one.1 The puzzle, thus, is straight-
forward: why, given the popularity of many liberal policies, is the conservative identity
nearly twice as popular as the liberal identity? In this chapter, I lay the foundation for un-
derstanding this puzzle, beginning by developing a theory of the derivation of ideological
identifications at the individual level. These identities, I suggest, are borne from psycholog-
ical characteristics inherent among individuals and environmental factors that individuals
encounter in their lifetimes. This individual level theory sets the stage for explaining macro
level changes in ideological identification, the central focus of the second empirical chapter,
which hones in on the 1960s when ideological identification experienced its largest shift in
history. In the final chapter, I merge the 1960s with present day by tracing elite rhetoric
and media coverage, demonstrating the detrimental presentation of the liberal label to the
American public.
Building a Theory of Ideological Identification Change
This chapter builds an individual level theory of ideological identification development,
and in turn, a theory of how and why these identities may change among individuals. To do
so, I rely on the work of others—political psychologists, moral psychologists, and political
1Data archived at the Roper Center http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.
scientists. The result is a piecing together of the central components from these literatures,
along with my own theoretical offerings, that produces a comprehensive understanding of
the origins and maintenance of ideological identifications. These primary components—the
origins—are critical to developing a theory of how and why identities can and do change.
In their seminal study of ideological identification, Conover and Feldman (1981) brought
evidence to bear on the then growing suspicion that ideological labels had sparse cognitive
meaning to individuals (Converse 1964; Erikson, Luttbeg and Tedin 1980; Levitin and
Miller 1979). That is, evidence suggests that the source of ideological identifications was
rarely issue-based or even policy-oriented. Conover and Feldman look to schema theory,
arguing that ideological identifications are borne from evaluations of the labels “liberal”
and “conservative” such that individuals’ identities are associated with positive evaluations
of his or her chosen label. Schemata can be thought of as cognitive structures, bundles of
images and symbols that individuals link to concepts or groups based on past experiences
(e.g., Fiske and Linville 1980). These frameworks help individuals organize their thinking
about groups and concepts.
Furthermore, Conover and Feldman suggest—and find ample evidence to support—
that the dynamics underlying the formation of liberal and conservative ideological self-
identifications differ significantly from one another. In other words, liberals identify as
liberals for different reasons than conservatives identify as conservatives. The key to this
finding lies in the “critical referents,” the cognitive and symbolic sources of ideological
self-identification that guide individuals in their choices. Different referents are pivotal
in determining positive evaluations of liberals and conservatives. Imagine, for example,
a self-identifying liberal, who has a strong affinity for the symbol of equality, which he
or she associates with the liberal label. This affinity for the symbol, coupled with its link
to “liberal” generates a positive evaluation of liberals. A conservative, on the other hand,
does not necessarily feel aversion for the symbol of equality (ergo negatively evaluating
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the liberal label). He or she may simply place himself or herself into the category of
conservative because of an affinity for the symbol of patriotism, which he or she associates
with conservatives.
To be clear, there are three moving parts of Conover and Feldman’s theory. First is
ideological identification itself. These identifications are informed by evaluations of ideo-
logical labels. And these evaluations, moving part number two, mediate almost all of the
impact which issues and symbols, moving part number three, have on identifications.
Conover and Feldman consider the unique contributions of two types of sources to ide-
ological identification: cognitive, or issue-based sources, and symbolic sources. Cognitive
sources are captured by considering respondents’ views on a myriad of economic, racial,
and social issues, including health insurance, guaranteed jobs, busing school desegregation,
marijuana use, the ERA, and sex roles. To consider symbolic sources, Conover and Feld-
man evaluate numerous feeling thermometers, collapsing them into six symbolic meaning
scales, including Status Quo, Radical Left, Capitalism, Reformist Left, Disadvantaged, and
Social Control.
Recalling that cognitive and symbolic sources influence ideological identification via
evaluations of the terms “liberal” and “conservative”, Conover and Feldman find that sym-
bolic factors were the clear front-runner in contribution, heavily outweighing the impact
of cognitive sources. Positive attitudes toward liberals are a function of positive affect for
the Radical and Reformist Left, while positive evaluations of conservatives are a function
primarily of positive affect toward the symbol of Capitalism.
Furthermore, in an analysis of open-ended survey items asking respondents what the
terms “liberal” and “conservative” mean, self-identified liberals and conservatives varied
widely in their emphases. Namely, liberals stuck to a broad message of change, including
recent social issues (e.g., abortion, ERA) and equality. Conservatives displayed a clear
economic focus, stressing fiscal policies and capitalism. As Conover and Feldman put it,
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“liberals and conservatives view the political world not from different sides of the same
coin, but...from the perspective of entirely different currencies” (Conover and Feldman
1981, 624).
In his update to Conover and Feldman, Zschirnt (2011) largely confirms the key compo-
nents of their theory and findings, specifically that symbolic sources dominate evaluations
of ideological terms. He likewise follows up on a prediction made by Conover and Feld-
man, who found that the impact of liberal evaluations outweighed the impact of conserva-
tive evaluations in predicting ideological identification in general. They suggested that this
result was potentially time-sensitive—conservatives may identify as such partly due to a
negative reaction to liberals and the symbols of liberalism in the New Deal Era. Liberals,
on the other hand, did not seem to derive their ideological identifications from a distaste for
conservatives. Conover and Feldman suggested that with the ensuing shifting of the bases,
this phenomenon may likewise shift directions. Their words were prescient, as Zschirnt
demonstrates exactly this: ideological identification in the modern era is increasingly in-
formed by evaluations of conservatives. The growing hostility toward conservatism and its
associated symbols of big business, Christian fundamentalists, and the military has become
an ever important source of liberal self-identifications in the more modern era.
Both studies present compelling evidence that the dominant symbols of the political
agenda play a significant role in informing the ideological identifications of citizens. While
neither study directly takes on the tangential, but related, question of the origins of the
symbols themselves, both make multiple allusions to elite rhetoric shaping the symbolic
meaning of ideological labels for Americans. As such, both studies take as fact the agenda-
setting power of the elites, and further, the media as the channel by which citizens absorb
elite rhetoric. What elites say, and importantly, how they frame their words, is a core
component of news in the American media (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder
1987). As such, the dominant symbols of American politics are largely controlled by the
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media and the elite rhetoric that drives its coverage. The larger, more central message is that
prominence, power, and the agenda of that power matters when it comes to understanding
macro level ideological identification.
The story of ideological identification in the United States is one of constancy and
change. Both consistency and change are linked to symbolic substance: this message
emerges clearly from the findings of Conover and Feldman (1981) and Zschirnt (2011)
who offer compelling evidence to support the notion that when the defining symbols of
ideological groups change, so too do citizens’ evaluations of these groups. Salience, then,
matters for understanding ideological identifications, especially changes in those identifi-
cations at both the micro and macro level. At the micro level, the critical referents that
individuals use to inform their identities shift along with the changing tide of the political
environment.2 And those shifts are observable at the macro level when changes in salience
are dramatic enough to move a large constituency of individuals.
How individuals feel about the groups, values, and symbols they associate with the
labels liberal and conservative dictates the identity they choose. Ultimately, to identify
with an ideological label, one must feel connected to the related group. And, of crucial
importance in this formation of affinities and aversions, I am suggesting, is the political
environment in which these attachments are forged. The extent to which elites are able
to garner power and control the agenda can have a significant impact on what symbols
matter to individuals, and thus, what referents they consider when forming their ideological
identifications.
Putting together these two elements together—how ideological identities are formed
and the importance of symbol salience and agenda control—leads to an important message:
most simply, ideological identifications can change. And they may do so when individuals
2In a related example, Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) found that party identification is best ex-
plained by positive feelings toward the constellation of groups associated with a political party. As such,
changes in party identification are driven mostly by changing social images of the parties.
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alter their critical referents either on their own (e.g., personal, individual level events) or by
the force of the political environment (e.g., cultural wars, elite rhetoric, media coverage).
Salience of symbols is largely dictated by political elites, and citizens come to understand
those symbols by way of the media.
The Psychology of Ideological Identification
Environment is not the only agency that influences individuals’ attachment to an ideo-
logical label. Psychological forces—those stable, dispositional factors unique to individuals—
influence attitudes, too, and play a decisive role in determining ideological identities. The
field of psychology has long acknowledged the hefty contribution of “motivational dif-
ferences” in explaining variation in ideological identifications among citizens (Jost and
Sulloway 2003; Jost 2006; Jost and Gosling 2008). Where political science has consid-
ered psychological factors like citizen involvement, sophistication, and political expertise,
psychology has factored in the predispositions of citizens, repeatedly concluding that ideo-
logical differences among citizens have psychological roots. Ideological identifications are
adopted, at least in part, because they satisfy psychological needs, and thus, have a strong
motivational basis.
Probably the most compelling finding in those endeavors has been the much-supported
conclusion that the structure of liberalism and conservatism rests on two main aspects: (1)
advocating versus resisting change and (2) rejecting versus accepting inequality (Jost and
Sulloway 2003). Change, in its very nature, involves at least some sense of uncertainty,
but individuals view this uncertainty in different fashions. Some experience threat and
anxiety in the face of uncertainty, and, as such, are resistant to change. These individu-
als typically demonstrate a dispositional need for order and structure, preferring stability
and accepting hierarchy, which in turn, makes them more accepting of inequality (Jost,
et al. 2007). Others, however, are far less sensitive to uncertainty, and, as such, tend to
advocate change (Wilson 1973). Ideological identifications, then, stem partly from basic
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social-psychological orientations concerning uncertainty and threat (Jost, et al. 2007). In
particular, conservatives, on average, possess a situational and dispositional need to manage
uncertainty and threat, which motivates their tendency to resist change and accept inequal-
ity (Jost and Sulloway 2003). The psychology of the conservative identifier compels him
or her to find the status quo particularly appealing, which, by definition, preserves the fa-
miliar and rejects the uncertain. Liberals, on the other hand, are not similarly motivated,
and thus are more open to change and less accepting of inequality. Indeed, the hallmark of
the liberal label is one of change (Conover and Feldman 1981).
Jost and Sulloway (2003) suggest that situational factors also influence the experience
and expression of conservative identification. That is, powerful environmental forces that
heighten psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and threat can drive up conservative
identification among citizens. It need not be solely an individual-difference variable—
citizens can be moved by the force of an event. Social movements advocating change, for
example, or a marked rise in crime would be particularly unsettling to conservatives (or
those individuals with inherent inclinations to resist change and accept inequality) because
uncertainty and potential threat are introduced. Thus, conservative identification in the
population as a whole can be increased by the introduction of threatening circumstances
or instability in the political system—or, critically, even by the pretense of such condi-
tions (Jost and Sulloway 2003). This is a powerful message, one that complements the
earlier theory that symbol salience, elite rhetoric, and media coverage contributes signif-
icantly to understanding shifts in ideological identification in the U.S. It means, in brief,
that the influence of elites and the media, and how these actors frame events, should not be
overlooked.
What this also helps uncover is that there is perhaps a slight variation to the theme of
conservative identifiers. Dispositional factors, the stable psyches of individuals, and situa-
tional factors, the short-term salient events in the political world that relate to uncertainty
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avoidance and threat reduction, should affect ideological preferences at the macro level.
Simply who we are matters a great deal in predicting ideological identifications, but, so too
does the changing environment to which we are exposed. In a larger sense, when threat
and uncertainty are heightened, either by an event, movement, or rhetoric, the appeal of the
conservative label increases considerably.
Social Identity Theory
It is useful to take a step back to understand in a deeper sense what ideological identities
mean to citizens psychologically. Social identity theory recognizes that all individuals are
members of numerous social groups—and that these memberships contribute to the image,
positive or negative, we have of ourselves (Tajfel 1974). Our social identities, how we think
of ourselves, come from these group memberships—whether they be national, religious,
racial, political, or of another type—and they create and define our place in society (Tajfel
and Turner 2004). Inherent in Tajfel’s concept of a social identity are two basic aspects: that
people perceive themselves to belong to a group and that the membership(s) have emotional
significance. Understood in this framework, social identities have certain consequences. In
particular, individuals tend to sustain those identities which contribute positively to their
self-concept, serving to maintain or boost self-esteem. Positive social identity is largely
created by favorable comparisons between the in-group to which the individual belongs
and some relevant out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 2004). Absent a positive contribution,
individuals will seek exit, unless leaving the group is deemed impossible for “objective”
reasons or exit “conflicts with important values which are themselves a part of his [or her]
acceptable social identity” (Tajfel 1974, p. 69).
Objectively, a black citizen cannot abandon membership with the group “black.” Simi-
larly, but related more to the value tie, a devout Catholic may find it impossible to renounce
his or her strong religious ties even in the wake of embarrassing sexual abuse accusations
waged at high-ranking religious leaders of the Catholic Church. While these accusations
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may have blackened the contribution this group membership made to the individual’s social
identity—and the conflict of values remains—the association with Catholicism is powerful
enough to prevent exit.
In such conditions, these immovable individuals have a couple of options. They may
engage in social creativity, reinterpreting the group’s image or comparing one’s group on
alternative or irrelevant dimensions to boost one’s image (Jost and Burgess 2000). The
devout Catholic may ignore the legal problems of the church altogether, instead choosing
to focus on the good the church does for the needy. Entrenched members may also simply
“own” the new characteristics assigned to them, attempting to reframe the values associated
with the characteristics (Tajfel 1974), such as with the classic example of “black is beauti-
ful” where the salient dimension of skin color remains, but the prevailing value system is
rejected and reversed (Tajfel and Turner 2004).
But when exit is facile, individuals are free to engage in social mobility, the move-
ment from one social group to a higher status group that more positively contributes to
the individual’s self-concept. Such shifts occur regularly when ties to groups are looser
and sufficient social flexibility exists. Such shifts likewise weaken the cohesiveness of the
abandoned group, lowering morale, and often setting in motion a degenerative path for the
subordinate group (Tajfel and Turner 2004).
A conflict of values within a group can likewise often be intense enough to destroy
the positive contributions it makes to some of its members’ social identities (Tajfel 1974).
Confronted with a new issue or relevant problem, social groups often disagree on the proper
approach, such as was the case of the leading pro-gay groups during the Amendment One
debate and vote in North Carolina 2012.3 While many supporters advocated attacking the
amendment head-on, with a message of “love is love” by promoting long-standing gay
3Amendment One proposed to amend the North Carolina Constitution to say, among other things, that
“marriage between one man and one woman is the only legal domestic union that shall be valid or recog-
nized.”
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relationships and families (and thus, sending the message that an amendment that prohibits
civil unions and gay marriage is unjust), the major organizers of the pro-gay movement in
North Carolina effectively “closeted” gay citizens, instead focusing on the amendment’s
potential to harm children and jeopardize victims of domestic violence. The incongruous
views on strategy are known to have caused serious discord among the various pro-gay
group members (Kreiss and Meadows 2013). Advocates’ ties to the pro-gay identity were
also likely weakened by the alienation they experienced.
Often in situations where values become more evident, able members will seek mem-
bership in the opposing group whose values, they now realize, are more in line with their
own. While a switch from a pro-gay group to an anti-gay group is far-fetched, the ex-
ample does make clear that often citizens identify with groups that evolve, or approach
issues in ways the citizen was not expecting. Situational circumstances can highlight these
values and shifts, and thus, have the ability to alter individual group memberships, and
consequently identities, perhaps on a large scale if the circumstances are widely known or
observed. We shall observe such a situation in the case of liberal identification in the next
chapter.
In particular, Huddy (2001) suggests that rhetoric—the words and actions of political
leaders—can manipulate political identities, even those sorts of identities that are consid-
ered quite stable over time (e.g., partisan identity). Evaluating what she considers critical
factors that give group memberships meaning to individuals, Huddy places considerable
importance on group “prototypes,” or the types of members that exemplify group mem-
bership and give the group meaning (Huddy 2001, p. 144). For example, if shaven head
braless disruptive women protestors represent the contemporary feminist, it would not be
surprising to find that white working-class males in the South distance themselves from a
feminist group membership. But, if NRA-supporting, Nascar-loving, white southern males
characterize the modern conservative, it would be less surprising to find that those same
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working-class males in the South are eager to identify as conservative. And, as Huddy
notes, “the news media are an especially good place to begin the search for the character-
istics of prototypes that exemplify social and political groups, given the narrow range of
people who appear in the news” (Huddy 2001, p. 144).
Social identity theory, then, provides important insight into why ideological identities
may change—and may need to change from the individual’s perspective. When citizens
identify with an ideological group, they give it psychological significance—it becomes
who they think they are. It is positively charged. But, what happens when the environment
changes, bringing out intragroup value conflicts? Or, when the classic prototype of liberals
or conservatives shifts? And finally, what happens when liberals discover that their group
has become stigmatized?
The short answer is that instability ensues. The longer answers will take center stage in
the next chapter. The psychological and historical components of the story of ideological
identification in the U.S. are coming together.
Moral Foundations
A final component to the psychological forces of ideological identification is that of
moral foundations, those guiding principles to which individuals refer back to when eval-
uating groups and symbols. These foundations work like “taste receptors” in the moral
sense, contributing to the ways individuals interpret the actions and agents they encounter
in their everyday lives (Haidt, Graham and Joseph 2009). In his compelling work, detailed
in his book The Righteous Mind, Haidt (2012) demonstrates that the moral foundations of
liberals and conservatives are fundamentally different. Of the five foundations outlined—
harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity—Haidt
and Graham (2007) find that liberals show greater endorsement and use of the harm/care
and fairness/reciprocity foundations, those that emphasize rights and welfare of individu-
als, compared to the other three. Conservatives, on the other hand, bring a more balanced
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plate to their decision-making processes, drawing from all five moral foundations, but espe-
cially from the last three: in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity, those that
emphasize group-binding loyalty, duty, self-control, and wholesomeness (Graham, Haidt
and Nosek 2009).
But, moral foundations should not be considered simply another set of personality vari-
ables that correlate with political preferences like ideological identification. Rather, these
foundations are the under layer, an explanatory framework of why such preferences ex-
ist. They can be thought of as “characteristic adaptations” (McAdams 1995), or mid-level
personality traits that encompass the goals and values individuals hold that guide deci-
sions and preferences. Characteristic adaptations are casually subsequent to actual core
personality traits, but are informed by both personality and contextual factors like the envi-
ronment. Political attitudes and behaviors, for example, are characteristic adaptations: they
are products of both core personality traits and life experiences (McCrae and Costa 1996).
Importantly, while many characteristic adaptations are relatively stable over individuals’
lifetimes, events, experiences, and changing contexts may cause these cause these attitudes
to shift (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling and Ha 2010).
In one of their original studies, Haidt and Joseph (2007) asked respondents to rate the
relevance of 15 concerns related to their moral judgments, all 15 corresponding to one of the
five moral foundations. Beginning with the stem, “When you decide whether something is
right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?”,
respondents were then offered the 15 considerations, such as “Whether or not someone was
harmed (harm/care); whether or not someone acted fairly (fairness/reciprocity); whether or
not someone betrayed his or her group (ingroup/loyalty); whether or not the people in-
volved were of the same rank (authority/respect); whether or not someone did something
disgusting (purity/sanctity).” Liberals rated the first two foundations—harm and care and
fairness and reciprocity—both at about 5.5 on a scale of 1 (not relevant at all) to 6 (always
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relevant) in their decision-making processes, while conservatives rated all five between 4
and 5 on this same scale.4 In general, these results demonstrate that the morality of con-
servatives is built upon all five foundations, and thus, that conservatives tend to “moralize”
more types of behavior than do liberals—whose morality is built firmly, indeed mostly,
upon foundations of harm and fairness.
Liberals and conservatives, then, are weighing different values when they evaluate
groups, policies, behaviors, and symbols. In a larger sense, these findings help explain
why it is so difficult for liberals and conservatives to understand each other—because they
base their arguments and evaluations on different combinations of the five moral founda-
tions.
All Together Now
Putting these pieces together, moral foundations (Haidt 2012), symbolic importance and
the evaluative process (Conover and Feldman 1981), motivated social cognition (Jost and
Sulloway 2003), and social identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 2004), suggests
a new theoretical framework for thinking about ideological identification formation, and
importantly, how and why those identities may change. Figure 2.1 maps out the causal
process I have described thus far. Dispositions (personality and moral foundations), along
with environmental forces influence the manner in which individuals perceive symbols and
issues. These perceptions influence evaluative process—in the present case, of “liberal”
and “conservative,” and these evaluations help determine ideological identifications.
This new framework merges micro and macro-level thinking. Individuals’ evaluations
of symbols and images in the political world are motivated by their inherent moral foun-
dations. An individual’s social identity and moral foundations shepherd the way he or she
evaluates the changing symbols and images in the political world, and thus his or her group
attachments.
4Liberals rated the remaining three at an average of 3.5.
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Figure 2.1: Model of Identity Formation
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Each of these theories hint at one other critical component: the environment, the context
in which citizens form and maintain attachments. The evaluative process for symbols and
groups (Conover and Feldman 1981) is premised on the importance of context: citizens
can only evaluate the stimuli to which they are exposed, and exposure is largely depen-
dent upon outside sources like news media and elite rhetoric. Especially important in this
environment calculation is the way in which these symbols and groups are framed by vari-
ous sources. Social identities carry significant psychological importance (Tajfel 1974), and
thus, individuals strive to maintain positively charged identifications. When groups shift in
meaning, by the force of political events or media framing, these attachments may dissolve
or change, making it difficult for individuals to maintain positive identities. Likewise, the
environment affects motivated social cognition. Psychological needs, such as managing
uncertainty and threat, vary among citizens (Jost and Sulloway 2003), and may also vary
situationally as powerful events and fluctuating environments can heighten them. Finally,
the moral foundations framework suggests that the context of exposure to stimuli can in-
fluence evaluations of those stimuli if certain dimensions are specifically (or purposefully)
primed. Applied to the political environment, the moral foundations theory suggests that
when fairness and harm are primed or salient in the political arena, the appeal of the lib-
eral label increases. True conservative identifiers are not as affected by this shift in focus
because all five moral foundations appeal to them. However, when the tone shifts back,
and one of the other three dimensions (mostly irrelevant to liberals) is primed or salient,
the conservative identity becomes more appealing. In these times, only true liberals “stay
put.” This asymmetry in the political world, the waxing and waning of value emphasis,
is a key contributor to changing ideological identifications. Thus, I suggest that shifts in
ideological identification—large scale or modest—occur partly as a function of oscillating
symbols, frames, and value foci within the environment.
19
These implications lend new theoretical and predictive leverage. We can be more the-
oretically driven when explaining what steers evaluations of liberals and conservatives,
and what drives ideological identifications. Likewise, we can provide clearer predictions
of how individuals, and thus, the larger public, will respond to changing saliency in the
political world. Social identity theory, moral foundations, and the shifting evaluations of
symbols in a fluctuating environment together elucidate the process by which ideological
identifications are formed, and most importantly, the process by which macro level shifts—
whether they be small movements or large-scale changes—are generated. Thinking about
these micro-level theories alongside the macro level force of framing links the micro and
macro stories of ideological identification. This thinking is applied in the next chapters first
to understand the most dramatic shift in ideological identification to date, the sharp decline
in liberal identification from 1965-1967, and then to evaluate overtime shifts for the entire
time series of ideological identification in the U.S context.
What Do We Know?
It is worthwhile at this point to shift gears and turn to the actual data which show what
we know empirically about ideological identification in the U.S. today. While social psy-
chology (e.g., Jost and Sulloway 2003; Tajfel 1974) and moral psychology (e.g., Haidt and
Graham 2007) supplied the building blocks in my construction of a more comprehensive
theory of ideological identification formation and change, they are not the centerpieces of
my empirical research.
Instead, my empirical investigation focuses on the symbols and images tied to the labels
of liberal and conservative, which has been done most recently by Zschrirnt (2011). As
such, my task here mostly one fine tuning and reinterpretation. But it is an important task,
for it sets the stage for what is missing, what more we need to know to develop a clearer
image of ideological identification in the U.S. in the modern context. With the guidance of
the theoretical framework outlined above, what’s missing becomes clearer, as do ideas for
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new questions.
The baseline questions are simple: who supports liberals? What symbols do identifiers
and supporters link to the liberal label? This investigation will be enlightening, but limited
in its approach. It will leave us curious. It will beg for straightforward survey items that
directly link ideological identities to non-political symbols and psychological factors. In
particular, it will not satisfy the questions that the theory of ideological identity formation
presented above would suggest.
Future research should seek to make these connections between a larger array of sym-
bols and groups to ideological identities, looking closely at symbolic and psychological
meanings of identities. I attempt to satisfy this curiosity with newly author-designed sur-
vey items currently being tested in the field. In particular, these new items directly link
ideological identification to psychological forces and an extended list of societal groups
and images (see Tables 2.9 and 2.8 in the conclusion).
The proceeding analyses represent a modern-day snapshot of the contours of ideolog-
ical identification, though they lack a direct connection to environmental forces, a key
component to the theory of ideological identification. In the second empirical chapter, I
evaluate the influence of such environmental factors, by taking into consideration a portion
of the full time series.
To motivate the analysis to follow, I begin with an observation: conservatives outweigh
liberals nearly two to one in the modern day. The most recent Associated Press poll asking
citizens to place themselves on the ideological scale reports 40% of citizens choose conser-
vative, while just 21% select liberal.5 As such, the analysis will focus heavily on liberals
and what citizens believe about liberals as a group.
5Source: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, USAP.120512G.RD02).
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Feeling Thermometer Analysis
Probably the most exploited method for analyzing ideological identification has been
feeling thermometers. These survey items ask respondents to rate various groups and fig-
ures on a scale from 0—100: the higher the number the warmer they feel, with the typical
reading suggesting that scores under 50 are “cool,” scores of 50 are neutral, and scores
above 50 are “warm.” In a nutshell, it allows us to observe citizens’ affects for policies,
groups, and members of the political world. However, such analyses are limited to avail-
able survey items, which are typically politically charged, restricting their utility. The
terms “liberal” and “conservative” mean much than politics to ordinary people (Conover
and Feldman 1981). Indeed, they are richer in context. Nonetheless, feeling thermometers
are a widely available and useful source for organizing an initial read on the ideological
map of identification in the U.S.
Like most survey tools, feeling thermometers are not perfect measures. In particular,
they are subject to positivity bias—the proclivity of respondents to respond favorably to
a wide range of political figures and groups (Miller and Gurin 1978; Sniderman and Tan-
nenbaum 1982; Knight 1984). As a result, all feeling thermometer responses should be
viewed as relative, each rating relative to the mean score of the individual. For example,
an individual giving one group a rating of 55 while giving most other groups a rating in
the 70s is registering “cool” on the former, even though a typical reading of 55 would be
slightly “warm.” Individuals use the feeling thermometer scales differently, and to properly
utilize feeling thermometers, this reality must be heeded.
Given the lack of perfect validity and reliability, Green and Krasno (1988) and Wilcox,
Sigelman and Cook (1989) have warned against the use of feeling thermometers without
controlling for random and non-random errors inherent in measurement response. Weis-
berg (1980) found that warmness toward Democrats was statistically unrelated to coolness
toward Republicans, and Conover and Feldman (1981) found that having a negative affect
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for liberals was unrelated to a warm affect for conservatives—both unexpected findings. A
central characteristic of partisanship and ideological identification is affective attachment
toward one’s “home” group, or in-group, coupled with a distaste for one’s home team op-
ponent, or out-group. Likewise, research suggests that even though individuals may not
understand the content of ideological “talk”, they can still hold strong beliefs about lib-
erals and conservatives as social groups (e.g., Levitin and Miller 1979). So, why do these
analyses not find evidence of bipolarity in evaluations of liberals and conservatives, and Re-
publicans and Democrats? According to Green, taken together, these findings suggest an
uneducated and indifferent public, perhaps largely conforming to Converse’s (1964) early
findings and lending credence to Kinder and Sears’s (1985) characterization of the mass
public as “innocent of ideology.”
In her analysis of positivity bias in feeling thermometer ratings for Republicans and
Democrats and liberals and conservatives, Knight (1984) created a mean feeling thermome-
ter score for each individual in the sample. The average of those means is the sample mean
which represents the overall average feeling thermometer score given in the survey. She
then subtracted each individual’s mean feeling thermometer score from his or her score
for each of the four groups of interest (Knight studied feeling thermometers for Republi-
cans, Democrats, Conservatives, and Democrats), creating an “adjusted score.” Averaging
across all respondents in the four categories resulted in “adjusted mean” feeling thermome-
ter scores for each group.6
Fortunately, by following Knight (1984), checking for positivity bias is straightforward:
generate a mean feeling thermometer score for each respondent and observe the mean of
the sample. If the mean is higher than 50, positivity bias exists in the sample.7
6Knight used these four adjusted scores for a different purpose than stated here, however. Specifically, she
correlated the means to test the unidimensionality of Liberal and Conservative and Republican and Democrat.
7Controlling for positivity bias in this way assumes that the feeling thermometers whose mean is the basis
for correction are representative of all the groups that might have been posed. While I cannot be certain about
the true µ, I am making the assumption that the groups observed are representative.
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In Table 2.1, “Feeling Thermometer Average” represents the mean of all respondents’
average group-based feeling thermometer scores in the 2008 American National Election
Study.8 The sample average of 61.17 is well above the traditional middle-marker of 50,
indicating positivity bias in this sample of responses to feeling thermometers. The first row
represents the mean for the sample of respondents who provided answers to all 25 group-
based feeling thermometer prompts presented by the ANES. The second row shows the
mean for all respondents in the sample, regardless of how many feeling thermometer ques-
tions actually answered. Both hover around 61, clearly well above a neutral 50, indicating
positivity bias no matter how the data are analyzed.
Table 2.1: Mean Feeling Thermometer Scores for Full Sample and Partial Sample (Re-
spondents Answering all 25 Feeling Thermometer Prompts)
N Responses Mean s.d. Min/Max
Feeling Thermometer Average 1615 25 61.17 10.89 29.84/93.16
Felling Thermometer Average 2312 varies 61.04 11.63 7.67/97
Two central points underscore this analysis: first, like most other studies with feeling
thermometers, this sample is biased by respondent’s tendency toward positivity when asked
to rate other groups and individuals; second, any averages considered in analysis should be
considered alongside its “corrected” mean.
We can answer how different these means are by observing, for each individual, how
much each feeling thermometer score deviates from the average feeling thermometer scores.
This adjustment to the biased mean will return the “true” feeling thermometer scores. In all
further analyses, these adjustments will be made, often highlighting significant differences
within groups that are imperceptible without consideration for positivity bias.
8Excluded are the person-specific feeling thermometers, e.g., Hilary Clinton, Republican Party Presi-
dential Candidiate. Items included are: Catholics, Jews, Whites, Blacks, Southerners, Big Business, Labor
Unions, Liberals, Conservatives, Military, Chicanos/Hispanics, Democratic Party, Middle Class People, Peo-
ple on Welfare, Poor People, Republican Party, Asian-americans, Congress, Environmentalists, Federal Gov-
ernment, Gays and Lesbians, Illegal Aliens, Christian Fundamentalists, Feminists, and Both Major Parties.
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Having confirmed the presence of positivity bias (see Table 2.1) and controlled for it
using the method suggested by Knight (1984), I turn in earnest to analytics.
The Dimensionality of the Liberal-Conservative Continuum
A central underlying theme runs through the theoretical framework I suggest for un-
derstanding liberal and conservative identity. While liberals and conservatives often find it
impossible to understand the other’s position, this is not necessarily because they disagree
on the same points of a political issue. Instead, it is largely because they talk past each
other, beyond each other (Haidt and Graham 2007). On gay marriage, for example, liberals
tend to understand the issue as one of fairness—two members of the same sex who love
each other and are committed should be able to marry. Conservatives, however, see the is-
sue as one of respect for authority and sanctity—long-standing institutions should be given
the benefit of the doubt, and gay marriage would challenge an ancient and well-functioning
institution.
This understanding of liberals and conservatives suggests that perfect unidimensional-
ity of the liberal-conservative continuum is unlikely. It also lends credence to what Conover
and Feldman (1981) found so many years ago: liberals identify as liberals for wholly dif-
ferent reasons than conservatives identify as conservatives. It likewise speaks to the under-
pinnings of Haidt’s moral foundations argument: quite simply, that the foundations differ
between liberals and conservatives. An ideological identity is rarely chosen as a rebuttal
to the “opposing” group. The motivations behind the two identifications are simply not the
same.
But let us put the test to the public: are “liberal” and “conservative” the poles of the
singular concept of ideological identification in the minds of Americans? Knight’s analysis
is nearly 30 years old, and the political atmosphere of the U.S. has become decidedly more
polarized over the years. What effect has the changed political environment had on citizens’
views on liberals and conservatives?
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I replicate Knight’s analysis here with data from the 2008 ANES, showing both results
without the positivity bias control and with the control. Because Knight demonstrates
variations by political knowledge, I also include correlations by level of education.9 If
individuals view liberal and conservative as the opposite ends of one concept, ideology, we
shall find highly negative correlations between the feeling thermometer scores for liberal
and conservative.
Table 2.2: Correlations of Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Liberals and Conservatives,
With and Without Control for Positivity Bias
Liberals with Conservatives
No Control -.085
Controlling for Positivity Bias -.379
The positivity bias control makes a significant difference in the correlation between
liberal and conservative feeling thermometers, pushing the correlation from an unimpres-
sive r= -.085 to a more healthy r= -.379. While stronger, it is only moderate evidence
that Americans view liberal and conservative as the poles of a unidimensional construct.
Given the prominence of these ideological terms in political talk and everyday rhetoric, a
stronger relationship was reasonably expected. Polarization, by any measure, has grown
considerably over the years. In a series of exhaustive analyses, Poole has demonstrated
that polarization in the House and Senate is presently at the highest level since the end of
reconstruction.10 Yet, these signals, as measured by affects for liberals and conservatives,
evidently do not permeate public thought.
It may also be that some Americans, perhaps the highly educated, do view ideology
this way. Knight used the “level of conceptualization” groups suggested by Campbell et al.
9Knight replicated the Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) “level of conceptualization” of four
tiers of respondents based on responses to open-ended questions: Ideologues, Group Benefit, Nature of the
Times, No Issue Content. I use level of education as stand-in for this analysis.
10Data, including figures and papers, available at http://voteview.com.
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(1960) to demonstrate that those with the most political knowledge were more likely to see
liberal and conservative as opposites. I use education as a stand-in for her more intricate
measure, and find similar, but less compelling results. As the level of education increases,
so does the correlation, suggesting that among those Americans with the most education,
many view ideology as lying on a single dimension.
Table 2.3: Correlations of Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Liberals and Conservatives by
Level of Education, Controlling for Positivity Bias
Pearson’s r N
Grade School or less -.146 59
High School -.223 808
Some College, no degree -.417 633
College or advanced degree -.556 443
Nonetheless, the general lack of compelling evidence for unidimensionality suggests
that ideological terms are simply not opposites for most citizens. Liberal is not the op-
posite of conservative. Instead, each group has distinct symbolic meaning to individuals.
Understanding these distinctions, I believe, is critical to explaining the heavy advantage
that conservative identification enjoys among Americans. This premise guides the inter-
pretation of proceeding analyses and those surveys presently in the field.
Affects for Liberals & Conservatives
Moving forward, I present a straightforward feeling thermometer rating: how respon-
dents in the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) “feel” about liberals and
conservatives.
The results of this calculation in Table 2.4 seems to indicate that respondents feel warm,
on average, toward both liberals and conservatives, as both ratings register above the rec-
ognized neutral point of 50. There is likewise a healthy range of affect for both groups as
indicated by a minimum rating of zero and a maximum of 97 for both groups. However, re-
spondents feel statistically significantly warmer toward conservatives (t = 4.08, p < .001),
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Table 2.4: Mean Feeling Thermometer Scores for Liberals and Conservatives
N Mean s.d. Min/Max
Feeling Thermometer for Liberals 1615 56.8 21.1 0/100
Feeling Thermometer for Conservatives 1615 59.9 19.7 0/100
Difference of Means 3.1
t = 4.08, p < .001
a mostly unsurprising finding given that the conservative identification is more popular than
the liberal identity. But does the public feel warm toward either group comparatively—that
is, when we consider how warm they felt on average toward all groups? The feeling ther-
mometer sample average of µ=61.17 indicates that respondents actually feel cooler toward
both liberals and conservatives than they do toward other groups.
Given that positivity bias plays an important role in feeling thermometers, we can go
a few more steps to observe the unbiased results of affects for liberals and conservatives.
Using the adjusted means created in the prior section, a deviation score representing the
difference between the average feeling thermometer score and the score for liberals (and
conservatives) is generated. These deviations are then subtracted from the average feeling
thermometer scores for liberals and conservatives, giving an unbiased look at how respon-
dents feel about these groups. Adjusted, unbiased means are presented in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Adjusted Mean Feeling Thermometer Scores for Liberals and Conservatives
N Mean Deviation Adjusted Mean
Feeling Thermometer for Liberals 1615 56.8 -4.3 52.5
Feeling Thermometer for Conservatives 1615 59.6 -1.5 58.1
t = 3.75, p < .001
What was significant in the preceding analysis of unadjusted feeling thermometers for
liberals and conservatives is further underlined by the adjusted analysis in Table 2.5. The
difference between affects for liberals and conservatives becomes more pronounced, and
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statistically so (t = 3.75), with liberals dropping even farther away from the mean ther-
mometer score (µ = 61.17), plainly out of the good graces of the American people.
In the next section, I shift to a decidedly more “liberal” focus. Given the popularity
of the conservative label, the analytical conundrum, as I see it, is explaining the dearth of
liberal identifiers. And, the first step to understanding that puzzle is coming to terms with
what liberal means to the American public. As such, I replicate the procedure of many
former scholars to set the stage, determining the main correlates of liberalism: what groups
are also supported among those who currently support liberals? Critically, however, I also
evaluate how do these correlations change when positivity bias is considered.
Correlational Analysis Between Feeling Thermometer Ratings
While many scholars have studied ideological identification by exploiting feeling ther-
mometers (e.g., Conover and Feldman 1981; Jacoby 2006; Ellis and Stimson 2012), few
have considered the effects of positivity bias in correlational analyses. Such a bias is partic-
ularly important when it comes to studying ideological identification. Taken together, the
findings in Tables 2.1 and 2.5 demonstrate not only the presence of positivity bias, but also
that citizens’ affects for ideological groups are significantly lower than for other groups.
This merits a closer look at correlational analyses.
Using data from the 2008 ANES, Table 2.6 reports the correlations between feel-
ing thermometers liberals’ unadjusted feeling thermometers and the adjusted feeling ther-
mometers.
A predictable handful of correlates of liberal register above a robust r>.30 in the second
column (unadjusted r). Three racial minority groups, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, are as-
sociated with support for liberals, as is support for illegal aliens. Other arguably marginal-
ized groups—environmentalists, gays and lesbians, feminists, and people on welfare—also
associate strongly with affect for liberals. Unsurprisingly, those with warm affects for the
Democratic Party also feel warmly toward liberals.
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Table 2.6: Correlations Between Feeling Thermometer Scores for Liberal and Feeling
Thermometers for Various Other Groups and Correlations Between Variations from the
Mean
Liberals with... Pearson’s r Adjusted r
Religious Groups
Jews .27 -.08
Catholics .22 -.16
Christian Fundamentalists .05 -.29
Racial & Regional, & Demographic Groups
Illegal Aliens .32 .07
Blacks .35 -.03
Asians .32 -.04
Chicanos/Hispanics .32 -.06
Whites .24 -.14
Southerners .14 -.22
Economic Groups
Big Business .12 -.19
Labor Unions .44 -.21
Sociodemographic Groups
People on Welfare .31 .03
Middle Class .24 -.09
Poor .26 -.11
Marginalized Groups
Gays & Lesbians .37 .21
Feminists .46 .23
Environmentalists .47 .25
Governmental Groups
Congress .38 .08
Democratic Party .45 .31
Federal Government .28 -.04
Both Major Parties .18 -.08
Military .01 -.25
Republican Party -.25 -.35
Conservatives -.08 -.38
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Yet, many of these connections fall apart when moving to the next column, the Ad-
justed r, which correlates adjusted affect for liberals with the average movement away
from the mean feeling thermometer reading for each group. Where once there was an as-
sociation between support for liberals and support for racial minority groups, for example,
the connection vanishes when positivity bias is considered. Positive affect for labor unions
also flips when considering how respondents placed themselves on the feeling thermome-
ter barometer compared to all other groups. Support for the Democratic Party, feminists,
environmentalists, and gays and lesbians remains intact—all is not lost.
It is a slight overstatement to say that support found in the first set of correlations
vanishes when we consider the adjusted estimates. It is more accurate to say that the
association, or symbiosis, between the two groups declines relative to other associations.
A different way of translating the deviation measures is to consider them a read on the “real
support” a respondent has for that group, based on the average level of support he or she is
willing to give. In particular, those who support liberals also support blacks, but when we
control for positivity bias, that association breaks down. Finally, hypothesis tests confirm
that the Pearson’s r is significantly different from the Adjusted r in each case at the p<.001
level.
The only mathematical truth needed to signal correlation is movement in the same di-
rection. When positivity bias is considered in respondent’s feeling thermometer scores, the
typical areas of correlations between warmth for liberals and warmth for other groups often
changes. Liberal’s common correlates no longer move with it.
Equally important in determining the correlates of affect for liberals are those symbols
and groups not associated with positive affect for liberals. Chief among these associations
is the Republican Party, whose strong negative correlation with liberals only strengthens
from the traditional correlation column to the adjusted version. Affect for conservatives
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predictably does not associate with affect for liberals, and neither does the military—
switching from no real association to a stronger r= -.25 when positivity bias is considered.
The apparent affection for Congress and the Federal Government felt by liberal supporters
falls by the wayside. Finally, a new group, Christian Fundamentalists, emerge on the scene
as particularly unpopular among those with strong affect for liberals.
Those holding a warm affect for liberals hold little regard and cool affects for a handful
of prized groups in American politics, including the military, Christian Fundamentalists,
and southerners. On the other hand, liberal’s supporters have positive regard for some
traditionally underrepresented or marginalized subsets of Americans: environmentalists,
feminists, and gays and lesbians in particular. The portrait of the liberal identity now has
its broad strokes.
Variations by Affect for Liberals
Another stroke in building the portrait of the liberal label is understanding how citizens
feel about liberals in comparison to how they feel about conservatives. Earlier evidence
(Table 2.4) demonstrated that, taken as a whole, respondents in the 2008 ANES felt warmer
toward conservatives than liberals. Dividing the sample by affect for liberals gives a closer
look at understanding this difference.
Using feeling thermometer scores for liberals, I generate a categorical variable that
breaks respondents into three distinct groups: those rating liberals below his or her own
average feeling thermometer score, Low Affect, those rating liberals at the neutral point
of 50, Neutral Affect,11 and finally those who rate liberals above his or her own feeling
thermometer average, High Affect. Then, I utilize the deviation measure created earlier
to gain new insight. As a reminder, this measure represents by how much and in what
direction the respondent’s feeling thermometer score for Group X varies from his or her
11The ANES instructs respondents to rate a group at 50 degrees if the respondent does not feel “partic-
ularly warm or cold” toward that group. See Codebook at link http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/
2008prepost/2008prepost.htm.
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mean feeling thermometer score (which includes all groups measured, N=25). From these
deviations, a grand mean, including the deviation for each respondent for each groups (Low
Affect, Neutral Affect, High Affect) is created.
Table 2.7: Deviations from Mean Feeling Thermometer Scores for Liberals & Conserva-
tives, Categorized by Respondent’s Affect for Liberals
Group Low Affect Neutral Affect High Affect
Liberals -18.43 -6.62 12.91
Conservatives 5.95 -2.01 -9.18
These constructions allow observation of how respondents vary, on average, in their
feelings for other groups (compared to their mean feeling thermometer score) when broken
into groupings of their affect for liberals. The primary comparison group of interest is
conservatives—how affects for conservatives compare to affects for liberals, based on affect
for liberals. The results in Table 2.7 show that those who feel cool toward liberals (Low
Affect) rate liberals, on average, 18.43 points lower than all other groups. Respondents with
a neutral affect for liberals register liberals nearly 7 points lower than other groups they are
asked to rate. And finally, in the (High Affect) group, liberals get a near 13 point bump over
other groups, on average.
Looking at how respondents deviate from their mean scores when asked to rate conser-
vatives, we find that those in the Low Affect for liberals group rate conservatives about 6
points higher than their average rating. Neutral Affect and High Affect rate conservatives
lower than their average feeling thermometer rating, about 2 points and 9 points respec-
tively.
An unmistakable message emerges from this analysis: individuals with low affect for
liberals express an uniquely strong distaste for liberals, rating them more than 18 points
below their mean feeling thermometer score. Comparatively, those with a strong affect for
liberals are half as harsh on conservatives, rating them about 9 points below their mean
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feeling thermometer scores. The lesson here is that the coolness felt toward liberals far
exceeds the coolness felt for conservatives. A new tidbit of evidence has been collected.
What’s Missing?
While the ANES provides quality information for understanding some political mean-
ing individuals tie to liberals and conservatives, it does not provide much else. Most no-
tably, it does not provide an opportunity to consider alternative symbols and referents that
may well make up the bulk of what these terms mean to ordinary citizens. If we can get
a hold on those common, everyday symbols, familiar to a wide range of citizens, we may
have a better chance at understanding the dearth of modern-day liberal identifiers. The
ANES likewise lacks the ability to make direct connections between ideological terms and
symbolic referents: correlations of feeling thermometers are a limited source.
Psychologists have been making considerable contributions to the study of ideological
identification, yet high quality political science survey data lags behind these advances.
A New Direction
Survey items designed specifically to speak to these two primary gaps are currently be-
ing administered. These items add considerable depth to what is ascertainable from feeling
thermometers alone. In particular, they attempt to pick up on the non-political tenor of
the ideological labels, while also including politically-charged groups for important com-
parison purposes. The items were also designed to tap into how citizens themselves view
members of the ideological groups liberal and conservative.
In the first set of survey items, respondents are presented with a list of groups common
in society and asked to identify them as associated with the term “liberal”, “conservative”,
“both”, or “neither” in matrix form. Thus, these allow for direct access to the groups and
symbols individuals link to ideological terms. They likewise provide high quality evidence
in the quest to explain the lowly ranks of the liberal label and the thriving popularity of the
conservative identity. Table 2.8 lists the Group Items in full.
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Table 2.8: Groups in Society Item List
Democrats Republicans Illegal Aliens
Feminists Environmentalists Political Protestors
Veterans Criminals Tea Partiers
Pro-Life Activists Pro-Choice Activists Real Americans
Pro-America People Judges Middle Class
Poor People People on Welfare Wealthy People
People with Retirement Accounts Born-Again Christians
Vegetarians Hunters Intellectuals
College Students Churchgoers Savers
Spenders Married People Single People
Professors Small Business Owners Farmers
Wall Street Executives Bureaucrats southerners
Urbanites Blacks Whites
Hispanics Gays & Lesbians Men
Women Immigrants The Medically Uninsured
*Order of groups randomized
Should results indicate that conservative associations are significantly more popular,
celebrated, mainstream, accepted, and generally positive than those tied to the liberal
label—which turn out to be associated with unpopular, irresponsible, and marginalized
groups—we will have gained serious ground in the quest to making sense of liberal’s de-
ficiency. These connections, if found, are also more robust than those uncovered using
correlational analysis of feeling thermometers from the ANES.
In addition to the groups battery of items, I also designed a similar set of prompts that
focuses more directly on traits and characteristics associated with the groups liberals and
conservatives. For these items, each respondent is given two separate batteries, one asking
whether they agree strongly, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree some-
what, or disagree strongly that the terms describe “liberals” as a group and the other, with
the same items, asking if they agree strongly, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree,
disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly that the terms describe “conservatives as a group.
These personality items are listed in full in Table 2.9.
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Table 2.9: Traits & Characteristics Item List
Extraverted Reserved
Compassionate Polite
Critical Conscientious
Anxious Calm
Open to New Experiences Flexible
Traditional Cautious
Emotional Dirty
Honest Immoral
Disrespectful Hard-working
Fair Intolerant
Obedient Sexist
Racist Dependent
Unreliable Broadminded
*Order of groups randomized
Similar to the Group Associations, the Traits & Characteristics Associations asks re-
spondents to make direct links between the ideological labels and traits. Both batteries
are designed to satisfy the theoretical implications of ideological identification formation
outlined in this chapter. The first component, psychological dispositions, includes both in-
herent personality characteristics and moral foundations. While these survey items do not
test the particular psyche of individuals, they do attempt to understand what characteristics
citizens tie to the ideological terms. In some ways, this approach is more useful. Firstly,
psychology studies have done a fine job peering into the psyches of individuals, linking
inherent personality traits to identities. But, we know considerably less about how individ-
uals themselves make these connections. These survey items attempt to illuminate these
connections wherever they may exist.
Together, these two survey batteries, Group Associations and Personality Associations
significantly enhance the study of ideological identification, particularly for providing new
insight into the continued unpopularity of the liberal label.
Despite these advances, the study design lacks the ability to uncover dynamics: how
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these associations may change over time by the force of events, media coverage, and
rhetoric. In the next chapter, I make this connection clearer, zeroing in on the 1960s, when
the liberal identification underwent a dramatic reframing, and as a result, suffered a mass
exodus in membership.
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3 ON THE 1960S: THE REFRAMING AND REMAKING OF THE LIBERAL
IDENTITY
It is a widely-observed paradox that liberal policy programs—Social Security, Medi-
care, unemployment insurance, regulation of the workplace, minimum wages, and many
others—enjoy majority support among American citizens, but identifying as “liberal” is
widely unpopular. Explaining the origin of that divorce is the focus of this chapter. The
problem, I suggest, is to understand how particular symbols rise or fall as associations with
ideological labels in the public mind.
In this chapter, I explore the most critical shift in ideological identification in U.S. his-
tory: the dramatic drop in liberal identification in the 1960s. In particular, I demonstrate
how the reframing of liberals left an indelible mark on liberal identification, one still ob-
servable today.
Ideological Identity at the Micro Level
Empirical studies of mass behavior have long borrowed an idea from elite behavior,
namely that ideology would consist of attaching concrete policy preference to underlying
abstract principles. Elite actors in politics combine generally consistent policy preferences
with descriptive labels like “liberal” and “conservative” which serve to summarize them.
So, we typically expect an imperfect and less developed variation of this phenomenon in
the mass electorate, but with always frustrating results.
What we’ve learned over fifty years, beginning with the classics, Campbell et al. (1960)
and Converse (1964), is that the neat connection of policy symbols to substance found
among elite actors is largely absent in the mass electorate. It would have been expected that
amateurs would have fewer and weaker connections between symbols and policy prefer-
ences than professionals in politics. But what we have found is stranger than that. Conover
and Feldman (1981) tell us that “liberal” and “conservative” are typically not seen as op-
posites, as endpoints of a singular continuum.1 And the Zaller (1992) conception of con-
flicting considerations has most Americans simultaneously holding on to core beliefs that
tilt in both the left and right directions.
If liberal and conservative are not always opposites in the public mind, then the elite-
based assumptions about ideological identification structure quickly fall apart. Liberal and
conservative cannot, for example, be the poles of a common dimension. And the whole idea
of a deductive structure that connects symbols to specific beliefs and preferences becomes
untenable.
Chapter One spent a considerable amount of time developing an individual theory of
ideological identification formation, pointing to both innate psychological factors and en-
vironmental forces. The basic notion can be summarized with a schematic model like
the framework used by Conover and Feldman (1981): that ordinary ideas about the terms
liberal and conservative and the symbols tied to them are collections of images and experi-
ences that start with early life experiences and build over the lifetime, not necessarily with
orderly deductive architecture . Schemata are, in brief, structured bunches of preconceived
ideas that help to organize knowledge and assumptions about a particular concept or term
(Fiske and Linville 1980). Some of the components of schemata for “liberal” and “con-
servative” are unique to the individual. We can understand the content they accumulate by
knowing the particular psychology and experiences of that individual. Those experiences
are systematic in some ways—major historical events are widely experienced—but also
have large stochastic elements. No two paths are identical due to the random shocks along
the way.
1In his update to Conover and Feldman, Zschirnt (2011) reaffirms this finding with more recent data.
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While it is impossible to know such a summary of an individual’s life experiences, it is
certainly possible to know what experiences were common to most Americans, what elite
messages were prevalent, and what the media covered. Absent a singular deductive process
that brings order to beliefs, we turn to collective experiences of politics to understand why
some images become attached to “liberal” and “conservative” while others do not. Criti-
cally, we come to understand what images citizens associate with ideological symbols by
knowing what image connecting events they have been exposed to.
It is also quite clear that the images that get connected to ideological symbols might
arise from quite far beyond the normal boundaries of electoral politics. An unshaved and
ill dressed counterculture adolescent advocating the legalization of pot, for example, is far
removed from the politics of elections, Democrats, and Republicans. But a citizen who
connects that image of protest to the schemata “liberal” will see that image as part of what
the word stands for all the same. Or an evangelical Christian who thinks that the word-for-
word literal truth of the Christian Bible is a “conservative” belief will not stop to ask if the
connotation is sufficiently political.
Research Design
The task of this chapter is to understand where the images associated with the symbol
“liberal” came from, especially those uncovered in the first empirical chapter that seem to
explain why “liberal” might be less popular than “conservative.” To answer this question
requires knowing what images the American mass electorate has been exposed to and the
degree to which those images became connected to the symbol in question. This is a tall
order.
Two sorts of evidence might be brought to bear. One of these is the actual connotations
of the word by American citizens, considered at length in the first empirical chapter by
observing what other images are associated with citizen responses to “liberal” and also
what groups and qualities citizens link with ideological terms. Longitudinal data of this
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sort would allow observation of how those correlations and associations were affected by
events.
This would be terrific evidence. It would show a process. First some image creating
event occurred. Then that image got connected to an ideological symbol. And then that
connection worked: the image became strongly connected to the symbol. There is some
such evidence. But not a great deal. Some important images are never measured. Others
are measured, but only decades after the presumed causal events occurred.
A particular limitation of such data is that political surveys tend to measure largely ex-
plicitly political images and ideas. Other, more distant, phenomena which might ultimately
contribute their meaning to political symbols are excluded because they are outside the
bounds of normal electoral politics.
A second sort of evidence, not quite as tight as the first, is a study of the sorts of images
that citizens were exposed to, explored via content analyses of press treatment of events
and images related to them. And where possible I will also study the evidence that images
got connected to the symbol in question, liberal. Evidence of this sort can tell us whether,
for example, Americans were exposed to the idea that liberals were soft on crime. But it
cannot tell us if the exposure mattered, if “soft on crime” did indeed become attached to the
symbol, “liberal.” That is where I shall proceed, interweaving the two kinds of evidence as
the data permit.
The Historical Series of Ideological Identification
Before explaining the evolution of the images of “liberal,” first comes the facts in need
of explanation. In their recent book, Ellis and Stimson (2012) build an annual time series
of self-identification. It answers the question, “How to Americans think of themselves?”
For the last 40 years, that task is quite easy. Survey organizations, both academic and
commercial, have been asking national samples of Americans how they see themselves in
ideological terms with reliability, frequency, and regularity.
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But, before 1968 is a different story entirely. Surveys that asked about ideological self-
identification were rarer, and question formats were far less comparable among the surveys
that did exist. Thus, the exhaustive data search, collection, and dynamic dimensional ex-
traction technique used by Ellis and Stimson (2012) to generate a series of ideological
identification is an invaluable resource for my research. It allows me to begin my en-
deavors with a valid and reliable measure, whose data are the universe of survey research
questions on self-identified ideology from 1937 to 2012. These are 2228 individual reports
of national percentage marginal results forming 20 separate question series.
The result is seen in Figure 3.1, where the estimated series of self-identification from
the 1930s into the 21st Century is presented. The growth of conservatism and the decline
of liberal identification are both widely assumed in popular commentary. There is some
support for that story, especially when considering the broad sweep of 20th century history.
But there is no support for its extreme version, that liberals were once a ruling majority.
The decline of liberal self-identification is an obvious impression of Figure 3.1, but it is
important to note that it is a decline from minority status, averaging around 44% of those
who declared themselves either liberal or conservative, to a smaller minority status, about
34% in recent years.2
While a more historically-focused explanation is the centerpiece of this chapter, a few
generic points on ideological identification are relevant here. The first is that the con-
servative identification has, ceteris parabus, more widespread appeal (Ellis and Stimson
2012; Haidt 2012). In a non-political sense, conservative is associated with caution, tra-
dition, and modesty. Individuals likewise have a natural preference for hierarchy (Zitek
2These figures are based on the series estimated using Stimson’s Dyad Ratios Algorithm (Stimson 1991,
1999), which uses dozens of survey items to estimate one series of ideological identification. For mathe-
matical reasons, the algorithm only considers “liberal” and “conservative” responses (and their ancillaries
like “very liberal” and “somewhat conservative”), so that the “liberal” percentage can be thought of as “the
percentage of liberals among those identifying as liberals or conservatives.”
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and Tiedens 2011), a core component of the conservative agenda. From the Moral Founda-
tions perspective, conservatives, on average, endorse all five moral foundations (harm/care,
fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity), while liberals
rely most heavily on the first two. The conservative palate is, thus, more balanced. “Lib-
eral,” on the other hand, has an innately limited appeal. It connotes indulgence, leniency,
and openness. Change and equality, the bedrock of the political liberal label, simply draws
a smaller contingency. So, at least part of the story of liberal’s unpopularity is explained by
the broader appeal that the conservative identity offers.
And, in a more historically relevant sense, and a bit of foreshadowing: uncertainty
and threat, as outlined in the first empirical chapter, drive up the appeal of conservatism.
Thus, under these environmental conditions, the appeal of conservatism will increase. The
hallmark of the 1960s was change. That change was certainly seen by some as positive
and necessary, but for many citizens, change was indicative of instability and threatening
circumstances. Environment—how this change was framed—is a central piece to under-
standing the shifting tide of ideological identification in the U.S.
A Closer Look at the 1960s
This preview of the problem to come is closed out with a look at an especially important
period of changing liberal and conservative identification in the United States. Figure 3.2 is
exactly the data already seen in Figure 3.1 except that here the view is zoomed in, focusing
only on the years 1960–1970, where the most crucial action occurs. Figure 3.2 does not
suggest what happened to ideological identification in the 1960s, but it does indicate pre-
cisely when. By far the biggest movement in the history of the identification series occurs
in a mere two years, 1965 to 1967, as 13 percent of those who once described themselves
as “liberal” ceased to do so. (Or 16 percent for the four year span 1963 to 1967.) These
would be noteworthy movements if they had been temporary. But Figure 3.1 demonstrates
that the departed liberals did not return. That fact needs explanation. We know the “when.”
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Figure 3.1: A Longitudinal Series of Ideological Self-Identification, 1937 to 2012, Gray
Portion Highlighting 1965-1967 (Source: Data collected by the author and estimated using
Stimson’s (1999) Dyad Ratios Algorithm.)
Now we need to know the “why?”
Two crucial pieces of data help begin the story. In 1964, when the ANES first posed a
“liberals” and “conservatives” feeling thermometer to a national cross-section, the majority
response for both was a single number on the 0–100 scale, 50. In 1964, 1966, and 1968,
the ANES coded responses of “don’t know” and “didn’t know much” with a score of 50.3
That suggests that a majority of Americans then knew so little about the meaning of the
ideological terms that it could not say whether they were good or bad things. That would
3Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/cdf/cdf.htm
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Figure 3.2: A Zoomed Look at some Data from Figure 3.1: Liberal Identification for 1960
to 1970 (Source: Data collected by the authors and estimated using Stimson’s (1999) Dyad
Ratios Algorithm.)
change.
Explaining Change in Self-Identification
Explaining why self-identification moved at a particular time is a twofold problem. It
is a macro and historical issue: how did the events of the time connect to attitudes? It
is an issue also for micro and psychological understanding. It requires addressing what
self-identification means and what it is. Together these two pieces of the puzzle shed light
on what happened and then how that series of events affected the development of mass
identifications.
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The causal story comes to life through a series of seemingly tangential events. At first
blush, it may seem unlikely that the first link is causally related to the last, yet the movement
from one point to the next is clear.
Central to the story, of course, is the very word “liberal.” While loaded with definitive
images and connotations to the modern reader, this was hardly the case in the early 1960s
when politicians of both parties often deemed themselves liberal, more often to be sure
the Democrats. But self-declared liberals existed in the Republican Party and were in
some places a dominant force. Similarly, there was no overwhelming connotation chasing
liberal. It is this lack of particularity, evidenced by the feeling thermometer data for liberals
in 1964, that motivates the story. “Liberal” did not experience a fall from grace in this story.
Instead, its largely empty connotation became filled with novel content.
For evidence of the limited connotation of “liberals” in the 1960s we have the number
of respondents in 1964, 1966, and 1968 who gave meaningful response to the “liberals”
and “conservatives” feeling thermometer. The earlier version of the ANES feeling ther-
mometers instructed respondents to assign a score of 50 to groups they did not know. So, I
delete the “50” scores, along with the usual non-response categories, giving us in Table 3.1
the percents who gave a non-neutral response each year.4
The table tells two things of note. One is that despite mainly liberal regimes since
1932 American voters were slightly, but significantly (p<.04), less confident assigning an
evaluation to liberals than to conservatives, whose day in the sun was yet to come. The
other is that the vacuum in evaluation of “liberals” soon began to be filled. Supplementing
this with the actual feeling thermometer scores for liberals and conservatives—the average
affect of the 50 or so percent who did give a response—reveals how different the paths were
for the two groups in the 1960s.
4The handling of missing responses changed thereafter, making any comparison hazardous due to different
treatment. Had the feeling thermometers been handled in a comparable fashion, they would constitute prima
facie evidence of the declining sentiment for “liberals.” With the changing procedures and question orders
from study to study, all we can be sure of is that changes in question administration can produce big effects.
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Table 3.1: Percent Meaningful Responses to Liberals and Conservatives Feeling Ther-
mometers, 1964–1968
(Entries are percents giving zero through 49 or 51 through 100 responses)
Year Liberals Conservatives
1964 47.3 52.6
1966 49.8 53.0
1968 53.0 54.6
1964-1968 Gain* 5.7 2.0
*p<.04
Table 3.2: Average Feeling Thermometer Scores for Liberals and Conservatives, 1964–
1968
Year Liberals Conservatives
1964 57.3 62.9
1966 50.9 61.2
1968 52.1 62.4
1964-1968 Change* -5.2 -0.5
*p<.01
Table 3.2 contains these “affects,” as measured by feeling thermometer scores on the
ANES.5 Besides the considerable difference between the general feeling for liberals and
conservatives—more than 10 points in the mid and late-1960s—the table reveals something
else. Indeed, it documents the degeneration in how citizens felt about liberals, while affect
for conservatives stayed largely consistent—and significantly higher (p<.01) than affect
for liberals.
To put this even further into perspective, consider the feeling thermometer sample mean
for each year (1964, 1966, 1968), a measure of the general affect respondents feel across all
13 groups evaluated.6 A sample mean is calculated by first generating an average feeling
thermometer score for each individual in the ANES study—this mean tells us how warm
5Feeling thermometer averages corrected for positivity bias.
6These groups include: Democrats, Republicans, Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Blacks, Whites, Southern-
ers, Big Business, Labor Unions, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Military.
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(or cool) each respondent is overall toward the target groups. Then, for each year, another
mean is generated, representing the entire respondent pool. Other scholars have shown that,
in general, respondents tend to be quite generous in their assignment of feeling thermometer
scores (Knight 1984), even when a healthy variety of groups are being measured, as with
these 13 stimuli.
The story is hardly different here. Respondents demonstrated considerable enthusiasm
for the groups considered in 1964, 1966, and 1968, with sample means of 72.4, 71.6,
and 70.8 respectively. Thus, liberals—and conservatives for that matter—are not nearly
as affectionately viewed by respondents as the average group throughout the 1960s. But,
critically, this is unusually true for liberals, who, by the mid-1960s are a full 20 points
below average—well outside the good graces of the American people.
Setting the Stage for the 1960s
Prior to the mid-1960s, liberal was synonymous with Social Security, unemployment
compensation, and minimum wage (Stimson 1991). The liberal identity, like liberalism
itself, was rooted in workplace protection and equality. It was the liberal of the common
man, what Stimson has referred to as “lunch pail” liberalism because it conjures images of
middle-age, working-class, white men going to work in factores and mines with their lunch
pails. This definition of liberal appealed to a majority of voters because it spoke directly to
their self interests. FDR solidified the connection, often calling himself and his supporters
“liberal,” and in the 1930s at the height of his popularity, almost 50 percent of citizens also
deemed themselves liberals (Ellis and Stimson 2012).
But with Lyndon Johnson and The Great Society, a decidedly more ambitious program
than its predecessor, the meaning of liberal shifted. It took on the responsibility for far
more citizens, most notably the urban poor, and even more specifically, the urban black
poor. Along with some of its popular programs, like Medicare, came some unpopular ideas
like the Poverty Program. As Johnson’s view expanded from common workers to the urban
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underclass, a subtle value conflict was created between individualism and egalitarianism
(Kellstedt 2003), for a defining characteristic of the underclass is that it did not work. At a
time of general prosperity, those who were not in the workforce drew little sympathy from
those who were. And with the new focus on underclass, the racial composition of the newly
defined “poor” became black.
Because “black” and “poor” are correlated images in the minds of most Americans—as
they were in the media coverage of the War on Poverty (Gilens 2000)—it is very hard to
pull apart negative reactions that are due to belief in the work ethic from those that are
simple racism. Almost certainly the general reaction has to be understood as some of both.
Americans do believe in hard work, independent of racial considerations. And race is an
omnipresent part of American political attitudes (Kellstedt 2003).
When workers—widely mislabeled as “middle class” in political rhetoric—were FDR’s
liberals, for many Americans that was “us,” not “them,” benefitting from government pro-
grams. As focus shifted from workers to underclass and as the racial composition of the
“poor” became—in the public mind, if not in reality—blacker, for large numbers of Amer-
icans the beneficiaries of LBJ’s liberals were “them.”
Where the New Deal brand was solidly based in self-interest—programs that most
Americans benefitted from or expected to benefit from—LBJ’s brand asked most to sacri-
fice for the benefit of the poor.
Potential Explanations for Liberal’s Declining Popularity
The 1960s did not suffer from a shortage of monumental events. Indeed, it one of the
most widely studied eras of American history, and as such, the potential explanations for a
dramatic change in ideological identification is not necessarily obvious. I explore some of
the leading contenders.
The landslide victories of the liberal Democratic party in the mid 1960s may have pro-
duced enough push-back from the American people that they simply grew disenchanted
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with liberal politics and policies—and swung to the conservative camp. Wlezien’s “ther-
mostatic” response concept would help explain such movements: when the public per-
ceives the government as doing too much, it responds by moving to the right, or in the
conservative direction (Wlezien 1995; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). Similarly,
when government output shrinks (or the public perceives a reduction of government), the
public responds by moving back to the left. Indeed, as the symbol of liberal was changing
throughout the 1960s, liberal identification experienced small drops of one to two percent
in the early years.
But the abrupt shock—from which there was no coming back—to liberal identification
from 1965-1967 is far from fully explained by the introduction of some unpopular programs
of The Great Society and by thermostatic response. Probably the most controversial part
of the Great Society, the initiatives tied to The War on Poverty, were also supported by
a majority of Americans in early 1967, after the critical drop.7 Thus, both the drawn out
nature of the Great Society and its relative popularity even after the dramatic drop in liberal
identification preclude it from explaining the swift decline in liberals.
There have been a handful of other potential explanations for this major decline, but
most modern day macroideology research, which cannot observe the period in question,
simply accepts the low ranks of liberal self-identification found later (e.g. Box-Steffensmeier,
Knight and Sigelman 1998). Probably the most compelling explanations ties liberal’s de-
pleted ranks to the Vietnam War, clearly a central theme throughout the 1960s and into
the 1970s. While the war was certainly garnering much attention in the 1960s, a late 1965
Gallup poll found that fewer than one quarter of Americans thought sending troops to Viet-
nam was a mistake,8 and by 1968, still less than half of Americans believed our involvement
in the war itself was a mistake.9 Further, the counterculture movement associated with the
7Harris Poll, March 1967 finds 60% of Americans believing the War on Poverty should be expanded or
kept at its current levels. Source: Roper iPoll, USHARRIS.040367.R2J
8Source: Roper iPoll, August 1965, USGALLUP.716.Q05
9Source: Roper iPoll, December 1967, USGALLUP.755.Q14
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war, including anti-war protests, came about after liberal identification’s significant drop.
Given the busy nature of the 1960s, it is worthwhile to consider a more global sense of
the country’s temperament, instead of simply working through potential explanations one
by one. Stimson’s Policy Mood (Stimson 1991) provides exactly this type of measure. It
relies on hundreds of survey items administered more than 8,000 times to the American
public, all asking respondents whether they prefer more or less government action or in-
volvement in numerous policy areas (including those central to the War on Poverty in the
1960s). If it demonstrates distinct movements of any kind in the mid-1960s, we would
know that the overall mood of the country played a potentially important role in redefining
the liberal identity.
Figure 3.3 plots policy mood in the U.S. from 1952-2012, with upward shifts meaning
more liberal, and downward shifts indicating more conservative preferences. The numbers
from the 1960s leave the hopeful unfulfilled: in general, the mood of the country from
1965-1967, highlighted in grey in Figure 3.3, is quite liberal, hovering in the mid 60 range.
And, in the three critical years, mood bounces down slightly in 1966, and then right back
up in 1967, higher than it began.
What is left powerful enough to explain the disappearance of such a large contingency
of liberal identifiers? Happening all the while in the 1960s was the civil rights movement, at
first quietly and peacefully, drawing the support of a majority of Americans, and indeed, the
majority of Congress. A full 95% of Americans supported Congress’s passage of the Voting
Rights Act in 1965.10 But after the successes against de jure segregation and discrimination,
mainly in the South, attention shifted to the urban North, where the issues became focused
on the tangle of race and class and quiet dignity was replaced by rage. The symbol of
liberal was about to change.
10Source: Roper iPoll, December 1965, USHARRIS.010966.R2A
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Figure 3.3: Policy Mood in the U.S. 1952-2012, Gray Portion Highlighting 1965-1967
The Race Riots
Harlem, 1964, was the beginning of several years of long, hot summers. In mid-July,
a 15-year old black male was shot by a police officer. Riots erupted. Six days later, the
riots spread to Rochester, NY and continued for three days. More than 1,000 people were
arrested and the National Guard was called in. The next summer in the Watts neighborhood
of Los Angeles, nearly 35,000 African Americans rioted. Thirty-four people were killed,
4,000 arrested, and the estimated damage was about $100 million. In 1967, a multi-city
outbreak of rioting, reaching more than 100 cities, resulted in the bloodiest summer of
all, with two of the most egregious in Newark and Detroit. Racial tensions between the
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black community and the nearly all-white police force led to riots in Newark where 26
died and 1,100 were wounded. Damage estimates hovered around $10 million. After
police in Detroit raided an illegal drinking establishment and attempted to arrest patrons, 43
people were killed, 1,200 injured, and 7,000 arrested in the resulting rioting. The estimated
damage was around $45 million.11
America was stunned. Images from these events and the many more like them appeared
daily on the front page of newspapers, and perhaps more devastatingly, nightly on the
television screen. The scenes portrayed ugly human behavior, flagrant violence, and, more
shocking to an orderly America, complete disorder. Were rioters the clientele of liberals?
The stage was ripe for change.
Defining Liberal
Were riots criminal acts or civil protests? Point of view made all the difference and set
in motion a new connotation of “liberal.” Liberal political elites and liberal public intellec-
tuals, deeply committed to civil rights and to the cause of Black America, interpreted the
riots as protests of the down-and-out against the terrible conditions of their lives (Flamm
2005). They honored the rioters’ behavior with the respect of the term “unconventional
political activity” and called for programs to improve the conditions of inner city blacks.12
The riots were a protest against poverty. For liberal political elites and liberal intellectu-
als the solution to rioting was to eliminate poverty (Flamm 2005, p. 46). In the hotbed
cities of rioting like Detroit, black men were unemployed at nearly double the rate as white
men.13 And in general, African Americans were deeply dissatisfied with social conditions
like housing affordability and education disparities, but became especially incensed by the
11For a detailed description of the race riots and elite reactions, see Flamm (2005).
12This term was used more colloquially among liberal elites, a nod to the belief among them that ur-
ban unrest was simply an attempt to engage in the political system. Violence was a political act when
it came to urban rioting, a central finding of the Kerner Commission Report (National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders) established by President Johnson in 1967 in response to the race riots. http:
//www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf
13U.S. Census data collected by the author.
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slowness of progress in the mid-1960s (Fine 2007).
Many citizens, however believed that rioters were simply criminals. In fact, in 1966
nearly 70% of individuals claimed they would strongly support a candidate for Congress
who deemed participating in a race riot a federal offense.14 The acts rioters performed—
burning buildings and automobiles, looting retail stores, violent measures directed at police
and outsiders—were well-defined criminal acts. And this is not merely an attitude, rioting
was criminal. For most citizens, the riots were truly terrible events, with an emotional force
of huge magnitude. The solution to many, probably including many self-professed liber-
als, was to treat rioters as criminals and put them in jail. The dividing line was a matter
of perspective, a perspective heavily dependent upon the media’s presentation. Ordinary
liberal-identifying citizens were thus presented with competing frames. On one side, lib-
eral intellectuals and liberal political elites were publicly calling for a focus on poverty to
curb rioting. On the other, the linkage between riots and crime was becoming stronger and
stronger. This dynamic process surely instigated intragroup conflict: one portion of lib-
eral citizens buying into the poverty frame, while others could not help but make the link
between their ideological identity and unspoken acceptance of crime.
Simultaneously, in the late 1960s, the dignified, religious, nonviolent civil rights move-
ment morphed into “Black Power,” with angry faces and a fondness for violent images and
language. It is not that the movement changed. What happened was that having achieved
considerable success, it became a less compelling and newsworthy story, gradually losing
the remarkable centrality of the earlier 1960s (Kellstedt 2003). It was old news. Looking
for a new story, the media found one in riots and Black Power (Knight 2007), a movement
of young people mainly in the North. The new movement was anarchic, unplanned, and
often driven by people seeking media attention. Violent and angry expression became the
keys to media access, though the media largely ignored the actual perspective of the rioters
14Source: Roper iPoll, October 1966, USHARRIS.101166.R1B
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in its coverage (Knight 2007). Where the civil rights movement had appealed to the shared
values of white America and linked itself with positive symbols, the message of Black
Power frightened white America—and intended to.
Along with the continual flow of gruesome images of the race riots came a change in
perspective, a change of frame. Even though the civil rights movement itself remained a
peaceful one, the lawless explosion of race riots demanded attention. Without leadership
or spokespeople, and certainly without the support of the civil rights movement, the riot-
ers carried on. They continued to burn cities and steal from local establishments. Their
frequency climbed significantly throughout the 1960s (see Figure 3.4). Rioters’ actions un-
dermined the frame of the peaceful civil rights movement (Rustin 2003). What citizens saw,
in short hand, was that civil rights led to rioting. The political group which maintained—
loudly and consistently—its support for civil rights was supporting an increasingly unpop-
ular cause. The symbols of liberal identity became burdened with symbols of race, rioting,
protest, and disorder. Thus, a liberal identification came to mean tacit acceptance of dis-
order and support for those behind it. These were not values and symbols that Americans
revered.
From a psychological perspective, this shift in the meaning of liberal posed a significant
problem for self-identified liberals. Social identities have psychological significance: the
groups with which individuals identify contribute to their self-images. Thus, if one of
these groups—like liberals—becomes negatively charged, individuals must act to protect
their self-image from the group—either by disassociating or by altering the image of the
group in their own minds (e.g., social creativity) (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Festinger 1954).
For those without a strong attachment, exit (social mobility) makes particular sense. In
terms of attachment to the liberal label in the 1960s, exit made sense for those whose
values and moral foundations were more centered on the dimensions of in-group/loyalty,
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Haidt 2012)—which were key framing devices used
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Figure 3.4: Riot Frequency across 410 U.S. Cities, 1961-1968 (Source: Data drawn from
Myers (1997))
by conservative elites. These individuals tend prefer tradition, legitimate authority, and
loyalty to one’s own family and nation. The liberal framing of the race riots certainly did
not appeal to these foundations. More centered on the other two moral foundations of
harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, liberals wanted to protect the activists and work for the
justice they deserved. These features of the liberal identity were the features stressed by
its leaders. And, these distinctions between the meanings of “liberal” and “conservative”
were made with incredible clarity by the competing framing of the race riots.
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The media, in its coverage of race riots, primed these differences rather clearly for
Americans. A new story emerged: the story of crime and its perpetrators.15
Critical Moment
Crime was of little political importance in the United States prior to the 1960s. This, of
course, was not for a lack of crime, but a mere lack of focus, especially from the political
arena. Crime problems were mainly local and state problems. Crime did not receive much
national attention before the 1960s.16
That would change in the mid-1960s, when crime moved to the front page of newspa-
pers and the lead stories in nightly television news. Beginning in 1963, the coverage of
crime on the front page of The New York Times jumped dramatically, and remained high
through the decade (see ahead to Figure 3.5). It became the centerpiece of another agenda
as well: the conservative agenda.17 Understanding that Americans put a premium on their
own security, conservative elites lured liberal citizens into their camp by consistently point-
ing out the inability of the liberal agenda (e.g., social programs, The Great Society) to
ensure personal security (Flamm 2005).
The “critical moment” (Carmines and Stimson 1989) that sparked the sharp decline in
liberal identification was set into motion when crime entered the scene. As conservatives
exploited public fear of crime (and thus, priming the conservative moral foundations of
loyalty, authority, and sanctity), liberals maintained their support for black rights (Watten-
berg 1967). But crime was on the rise, and there was no mistaking the perpetrators. This
new issue partially reframed civil rights. Crime became a buzzword, an entry point to say
certain things about race without explicitly mentioning race.
15Even the Kerner Report, certainly not hailed by the Johnson Administration, conceded that the media had
a “cumulative effect” on the riots, partly by overplaying the race angle. http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.
org/docs/kerner.pdf
16Proceeding author designed content analysis provides tangible evidence of this.
17This is not necessarily a media influence story. It is clear from the stories that what The Times was doing
was reporting that conservatives were making effective use of the issue.
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I argue that liberal identification became unpopular because it was associated with soft-
ness on crime via the race riots, not because support for civil rights declined. Most conser-
vative elites did not publicly denounce civil rights, and they certainly did not mock liberals
for doing so. They merely ignored the complexity of the issue of civil rights, zeroing in on
one easily understandable issue that heightened the fears of ordinary citizens. They called
attention to rising crime rates, and were not shy about what types of crime they meant:
looting, arson, and any other implicit connection to race riots. Rioting and urban unrest
had obvious perpetrators, and more defaming for liberal identification, clear supporters.
The riots changed the image of the civil rights movement, though neither the clientele
nor the mechanism of the two overlapped. Civil rights activists did not morph into Black
Power adherents, nor did civil rights philosophy ever support forceful and violent means
for achieving its goals—a key symbol of the Black Power movement (Rustin 2003). Even
more, the goals themselves were quite different: the civil rights movement asked for vot-
ing rights and public accommodations, which it largely won. The rioters, fueled by the
successes of the civil rights movement, demanded instant economic progress. It was a rev-
olution of rising expectations. Too much success, too soon, caused expectations to rise out
of line with reality.
With civil rights goals largely realized by 1964 and 1965, media attention shifted, as it
does, to the next big story. A main story of 1965-1967 was the race riots: the images on
television and the newspapers shifted from peaceful protests to violent scenes of looting,
arson, and disorder. And in this quiet shift, the rioters took over the image of civil rights,
black Americans, crime, and the liberal identity—now, a connected bundle of images.
Equally important to the story is the response of liberal elites to this reframing. In
a word, the response was “nothing” (Baker 1969). If anything, liberal elites and liberal
intellectuals continued to support the rioters, but louder and more fervently. Liberal elites
were passionately committed to the cause of racial equality. “Unconventional political
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activity” was rooted in poverty and unemployment. The solution was social programs that
addressed these underlying issues (Flamm 2005). To everyone else, and with a nod to the
issue framing of the conservatives, rioting was just crime.
The Politicization of Crime
Before the 1960s, crime was an apolitical topic. There was no overt association between
crime and liberal or crime and conservative. Media coverage of crime typically referred to
organized crime (and before that, juvenile delinquency), and even that coverage was spotty.
Both of these facts changed in the 1960s. Both the coverage of crime and the rise in violent
crime increased in the 1960s, demonstrated in Figure 3.5.18
The solid line in Figure 3.5 is a simple count of front page stories, by year, that mention
crime. The dotted line is the violent crime rate, as measured by the FBI.
The mere fact of coverage does not necessarily leave an imprint on the public mind.
But we know more. We know that the public was concerned about crime. The Gallup
organization regularly surveys Americans, asking them what they believe to be the most
important problem facing the nation. Although “Vietnam” was the leading response in
the 1960s, the percentage of people who responded “crime” dramatically increased in the
1960s, from about 2% in 1960 to 20% by 1968, demonstrated in Figure 3.6.19
In this busiest of all decades, the time of civil rights, the Vietnam War, political as-
sassinations, and riots, it is impressive that an issue such as crime could be seen as the
most important problem by numerous Americans, rising to 20% in 1968. And since that
same year is the high point of race riots, there is little question that “crime” had become
something more than ordinary street crime at that time. The riots effectively erased the
distinction that liberal elites worked so hard to draw: the line separating race and crime
(Flamm 2005).
18Source: Crime statistics from FBI Uniform Crime Reports; The New York Times data compiled by the
author.
19Source: Policy Agendas Project Most Important Problem Data, responses coded into Major Topic 12:
Law, Crime, and Family.
59
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
Year
NY
T 
Fr
on
t P
ag
e M
en
tio
ns
 of
 C
rim
e a
nd
 C
rim
e R
ate
s
Crime Rate
'Crime' Mentions
Figure 3.5: The Crime Rate and The New York Times Front Page Coverage of Crime
(Source: Crime rate data collected by the authors from FBI Uniform Crime Reports; Media
data compiled by the author from The New York Times via ProQuest Historical Newspapers
database.)
Crime No Longer Neutral
A rise in front page coverage of crime and a rise in the actual crime rate, no matter how
dramatic both were, is not surprising. We would expect that The New York Times would
cover crime more if crime rates increased. But “crime” did not remain politically neutral.
Softness on crime came to be associated with the liberal label. It was the liberal politician
who blamed rioting on social ills. It was a liberal Supreme Court, a point given more
attention later, that protected the rights of the accused—or coddled criminals, a matter of
perspective.
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Figure 3.6: Proportion of Respondents citing “Crime” as America’s Most Important Prob-
lem in Gallup Poll (Source: Policy Agendas Project “Most Important Problem Data.”)
It takes more than an argument to connect a charge like “soft on crime” to the images
that ordinary people connect to an ideological symbol, such as liberal. Such ideological
zingers are a normal part of political rhetoric. Most do not leave a trace. In this case, there
was more, a sustained association of the symbols “crime” and “liberal” in public dialogue.
For evidence of that I have searched for an association the public might have seen in the
daily press, using The New York Times as my primary source. While most Americans did
not personally experience criminal acts or participate in riots themselves, these events were
certainly widely covered in the news, making actual media coverage a reasonable proxy for
the events (Kellstedt 2000; Krosnick 1990). The way in which media portrayed the riots
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and protests is relative and important—and indeed, our best (and often employed) strategy
for understanding opinion change of a bygone era (Krosnick 1990, e.g)20
I count the number of times that the topic crime is associated with the word liberal in
front page news stories. Figure 3.7 plots the count of front page articles mentioning both
for the period 1960 to 1970.21
The figure shows a baseline level of association in the early 1960s of ten or so such
stories per year. Beginning in 1965 that number rises dramatically and steadily to an ulti-
mate level of about 60 at the end of the decade. And if one can find a growing association
between crime and liberal in the friendly New York Times, it could evidently be found any-
where.
The connection is there to be seen. For instance, on August 3, 1967, The New York
Times quoted Vice President Humphrey as saying “liberals have not faced certain problems
because they were protecting the good name of the poor” and by June of 1968, The New
York Times reported that while the liberal candidate in Texas had been favored for the
governorship, “he faltered...after [the conservative] proposed new state laws to crack down
on ‘crime in the streets,’ including stiffer penalties for looting and street crime.” By early
August, The Times noted that the shifting connotation of civil rights pushed the Republican
Party to the right on the issue of law and order as it levied a militant crusade against crime—
“because the right to be free from domestic violence has become the forgotten civil right.”
The images of liberal, race, and crime were becoming a tighter bundle.
In his study of the mass media and racial attitudes, Kellstedt (2003) demonstrates a
20Without doubt, television news became a central outlet for many Americans in the 1960s, surpassing
newspapers as the primary source of news (Source: Gallup). However, the two assumptions made by the
proceeding style of analysis are that newspapers, in particular, the print news leader, The New York Times,
was covering much of the same news as television news, especially in such highly salient conditions as the
race riots. And, secondly, that The New York Times is a powerful agenda setter in the media—a source
indicative of the national news agenda, both in print news and television news. Finally, archival data for
television news dates back only to 1968 (Vanderbilt Television News Archive), and thus, misses the critical
time period being studied in this dissertation.
21Data compiled by the author from New York Times via ProQuest Historical Newspapers database.
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Figure 3.7: Count of New York Times Page Stories mentioning “Crime” and “Liberal”
(Source: Data compiled by the author from New York Times via ProQuest Historical News-
papers database.)
related, and complementary, phenomenon. Through careful content analysis of Newsweek,
Kellstadt shows that media coverage of racial issues in the U.S. can be largely understood
through the lens of two competing frames: egalitarianism and individualism. And, the
public’s response—support for racially related policies—is closely tied to this framing.
When the media uses egalitarian cues to deliver its story, support for racial equality (in
many forms), increases. However, when individualism cues dominate the framing, racial
equality mood declines.
Egalitarian cues reached their historical maximum (of the years studied, 1950-1995) in
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1963, with an average of roughly nine cues per week throughout that year (Kellstedt 2003,
p. 37). By 1964, the egalitarianism frame saw a slight decline, but still boasted a level
that trumps any proceeding year. But 1965 through 1966 was a different story entirely.
Egalitarianism cues dropped abruptly: from their height in 1963 (482 cues), to a new low
point by 1966 (150), at a magnitude of nearly 70% in just two years.
Kellstedt’s study lends two sorts of valuable evidence: first, that the media plays a
dominant role in shaping public opinion; and second, that the tenor of the media’s coverage
of race changed in important—and dramatic—ways in the 1960s.
And the Impact
Returning to the analysis at hand, perhaps most telling is Figure 3.8 which traces con-
servative identification (or 100 - liberal identification) with the dotted line (anchored by the
right y-axis) alongside the growth in stories including both “liberal” and “crime,” the black
line. The correlation between the two measures is 0.80: strong evidence of a connection
between the decline of liberal identification and the emergence of crime, and issues bun-
dled in with it. As liberals became progressively bundled with race and crime, they became
less appealing.
The Warren Court
The media were not the only institutions paying increasing attention to crime in the
1960s. Indeed, as crime rates grew, so did the number of court cases addressing the rights
of accused criminals. Chief Justice Earl Warren led the U.S. Supreme Court throughout the
early 1950s and 1960s, and quickly made his mark with the landmark decision in Brown
v. Board of Education, ending school segregation. In the years following Brown, Warren
managed to keep the Court unanimous in all decisions addressing segregation. These deci-
sions set the liberal tone for the Warren Court, and by the early 1960s, the High Court began
addressing the right of privacy, due process, and rights of criminal defendants. Although
many of the decisions now seem to be core instruments of modern American democracy,
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Figure 3.8: Front Page The New York Times Stories Mentioning “Crime” and “Liberal” To-
gether and Rise in Conservative Identification (Source: Ideological Identification data col-
lected by the author and estimated using Stimson’s (1999) Dyad Ratios Algorithm; Media
data compiled by the authors from The New York Times via ProQuest Historical Newspa-
pers database.)
the Warren Court issued a handful of controversial decisions in the 1960s that dramatically
changed the landscape of criminal law: Mapp v. Ohio (1961) prevented prosecutors from
using evidence found in illegal searches, Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) provided counsel to
indigent defendants, and Miranda v. Arizona (1968) required the clear citing of defendant’s
rights to those in police custody.
The newly established rights were based upon principles that many—and maybe even
most—Americans could support. But the pattern of the decisions, showing concern for the
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rights of accused criminals at the time of rising crime, was politically dangerous. There
is no reason to think that clarifying the rights of the accused had anything to do with the
rising crime rate. But the connection was easy to draw, and it was drawn repeatedly.
Crime and the courts are easy to connect. But we need evidence for one more connec-
tion, the Court and the symbol of liberal. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 lend credence to the idea
that the U.S. Supreme Court was viewed in an increasingly liberal manner during Warren’s
tenure.22 Figure 3.9 provides a simple count of front page stories in The New York Times
that mention “liberal” alongside “U.S. Supreme Court,” a figure that grew significantly—
from about 1500 to nearly 3500—under Chief Justice Warren’s time on the Court, and
falling considerably after his departure in 1969.
Looking specifically at Warren’s time in office, Figure 3.10 shows that the percentage
of front page stories mentioning liberal and the U.S. Supreme Court grew noticeably in the
mid-to-late 1960s, the time frame when liberal identification dropped so significantly. In
his later years on the Court, nearly 15 percent of the stories mentioning the Supreme Court
also referred to “liberal”, a near three-fold increase from Warren’s earlier years.23
All the while, violent crime rates rose to record highs throughout the U.S., especially
in big cities, fueling the concern that crime was a major national dilemma that must be
addressed.
Context Matters
More is needed, particularly the context of the association between the stories mention-
ing “crime” and “liberal” before the story is fully realized. Using content analysis, every
front page story that mentioned the two terms was read and analyzed for tone. Stories with
neutral or no association between the terms were coded 0. Stories with positive associations
(e.g., liberals have done much to curb the crime problem in America), of which there are
22Source: Compiled by the authors with Historical The New York Times data.
23This percentage is calculated as the total number of front page stories mentioning “liberal” and the U.S.
Supreme Court divided by the total number of front page stories mentioning U.S. Supreme Court.
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Figure 3.9: Count of Front Page The New York Times Stories Mentioning ‘Liberal’ and the
U.S. Supreme Court (Source: Data compiled by the author from The New York Times via
ProQuest Historical Newspapers database.)
few, are coded 1. Finally, stories with a negative association (“The conservative candidate
charged that ‘the more liberal federal government has attempted to legislate morality, the
more it actually has incited hatred and violence’ ” (NYT, 9/11/64)) are coded -1. From
this coding, a yearly measure of Negativity is generated that captures the context of the
association between “liberal” and “crime.”24 Figure 3.11 puts it all together, plotting both
Liberal Identification (black line) and Negativity (dotted line). The correlation over the 10
year span is -0.89, evidence that the decline of liberal identification and the image of crime
24In particular, Negativity is the number of articles coded -1 divided by the total number of articles that
mention both “crime” and “liberal.”
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Figure 3.10: Percentage of Front Page The New York Times Stories Mentioning ‘Liberal’
Alongside the ‘Warren Court’ (Source: Data compiled by the author from The New York
Times via ProQuest Historical Newspapers database.)
are linked.
After the Riots
The race riots of the mid 1960s set into motion the frame that underscores “liberal”
identification today. After the streets were cleared and burned businesses rebuilt, liberal
remained scarred with the image and symbol of crime and tacit support for those racial
minorities who made citizens fear for their own safety. From that point on, “liberal” con-
tinued on its negative path. Perhaps the millions of working class whites who considered
themselves liberals because they connected the term to labor unions and the Democratic
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Figure 3.11: The Growth of Negative Associations between “Liberal” and “Crime” in The
New York Times Front Page Stories Mentioning “Liberal” and “Crime” and the Decline of
Liberal Identification (Source: Ideological Identification data collected by the author and
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party abandoned the liberal identity in an “us against them” reaction to genuine fear of
crime. Figure 3.11 provides some evidence of this—as the association between crime and
liberal grows, the percentage of individuals identifying as liberal declines. Perhaps the
salience of the conservative moral foundations of loyalty, authority, and sanctity was too
overwhelming to outweigh the more liberal foundations of care and fairness.
Enter Richard Nixon. His was the first presidential campaign with a “law and order”
theme, focusing his message in 1968 on attacking street crime and racial protest, promising
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that his “tough on crime” measures would solve disorder. Once a conventional Republican
moderate on racial issues, Nixon’s new approach, coupled with a strong Southern strat-
egy, gave his candidacy a new character—and perpetuated the declining image of a liberal
identity.
Figure 3.12 illustrates this critical linkage between blacks and crime as told to the Amer-
ican people by the highly circulated magazine Newsweek. In particular the figure shows the
annual frequency of mentions of “crime” in racially charged stories, those that mention ei-
ther “black,” “negro,” or “African American.” While a simple presentation of the data, the
message is nonetheless powerful: the themes of race and crime became increasingly linked
throughout the 1960s. Given the strong connection between crime and liberals, it was in-
evitable that race would become a part of the liberal bundle. When crime rates dropped and
the riots subsided, crime itself became a less compelling symbol. But the racial element of
the liberal identity became an ever-present part of what liberal means in American politics.
If the only explanation needed was why so many liberals disappeared during the late
1960s, these two explanations, the race riots and the politicalization of crime, may suffice.
But the riots and crime could not last as central preoccupations of citizens. For the “liberal”
brand to remain deeply unpopular—and often among people who were themselves liberal
in their political outlook—these violent, but fleeting, images needed to be replaced. And
they were. “Burn baby, burn” was replaced by “Hell no, we won’t go” as self-described
liberals later united against the Vietnam War. To the image “soft on crime” the 1970s added
“unpatriotic” to the collective image of a liberal. Young men and women of privilege at
elite universities endeared themselves to working class America by referring to the police
who opposed them as “pigs.” And then pot and the counterculture added to the mix. All
in all, the images of the strait-laced defenders of working America of the times of FDR
through JFK were thoroughly replaced by a modern image of largely pejorative elements.
Their justifications were mostly anchored by the liberal foundations of fairness and justice.
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1960-1970. (Source: Newsweek raw data provided by Paul Kellstedt)
Democrats, all the while, continued to be popular and continued to win elections. But
they did so in part by disassociating themselves from the now unpopular label “liberal.”
Elected politicians after all didn’t riot, (mostly) didn’t march against the War, and didn’t
adopt the styles and attitudes of the counterculture. So they could escape association with
the marred image of liberal. But by disassociating themselves, they added to the illegitimate
connotations of the word. If liberalism was not about defending Social Security, increasing
the minimum wage, standing up for the right to bargain collectively, what was it? The task
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of adding to the definition was largely left to the opponents of liberalism. And they took to
it with gusto. This element of the story of ideological identification is explored at length in
the third chapter of the dissertation.
The evidence accumulated to this point sustains the message that citizens attending
to media coverage might have begun to connect the symbol “liberal” to racial and soft
on crime connotations. Now, turning to another sort of evidence: observing the degree
to which response to the political group “liberals” becomes associated with these other
images.
Evidence for the Changing Connotation
If the interpretation of the crucial events of the late 1960s is true, it should be the case
that there is evidence in the changing connotation of “liberal.” There are stark limits to
what we can observe because for this “end of ideology” period in American political life
neither liberalism or the things that are associated with a liberal identity it are well or often
measured. The best we can do is the National Election Study feeling thermometer for
“liberals.” That begins in 1964. But most of the possible associations suggested so far do
not have measures in the ANES series until 1970 or after. So we can observe the growth
of new associations over about a decade and a half beginning in 1964. But most cannot be
observed both before and after, as would be crucial evidence, but only after.
The first glimpse (see Figure 3.13) at 1964—already “after” for most of the impor-
tant civil rights movement events—shows quite modest correlations between response to
“liberals” and response to “blacks” (0.19) and to “labor unions” (0.19). From that point,
where half of the respondents did not supply a non-neutral rating, the picture is simple:
connotation grows over time. Correlation with everything grows over the period. The least
impressive of these are with traditional Democratic images, labor unions and poor people,
which grow only slightly. Most obvious is the clear racialization of images of liberals, with
striking increases in correlations for “civil rights leaders” (to 0.52), “black militants” (to
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Figure 3.13: Correlations of the “Liberals” Feeling Thermometer with Other Feeling Ther-
mometers and Preference Indicators, 1964–1980 (Source: American National Election
Studies)
0.37), and generic “blacks” (to 0.33).25
The ANES seven point scale on urban unrest26 is added to thermometer images. The
expected association emerges. Those who don’t like rioters don’t like liberals either. The
question is not posed for the first time until 1968, and so there is no evidence on what
25We have argued that the traditional civil rights leaders should have had a quite different reception from
the black militants who replaced them in the late 1960s limelight. We do not see that in the correlations. But
it is hard to know what respondents had in mind for “civil rights leaders” because the question was not posed
for the first time until the traditional nonviolent leaders had already been pushed aside for public attention by
the black power advocates (and Martin Luther King was already dead). Probably “civil rights leader” took in
both sorts of image.
26Question wording: “There is much discussion about the best way to deal with the problem of urban
unrest and rioting. Some say it is more important to use all available force to maintain law and order – no
matter what results. Others say it is more important to correct the problems of poverty and unemployment
that give rise to the disturbances. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very
much about this?”
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association such an item might have had before the riots.
Thus, what has been posited about the race riots bears out in the data in unmistakable
fashion: the liberal “bundle” includes not just images of crime, but it is also lined with
images of civil rights, black militants, urban unrest, and more generally, blacks. It is the
convergence of crime and blacks, and the resulting racialization of crime that has allowed
“crime” itself to serve as a stand-in for race, an implicit symbol that has never been erased
from the liberal label.
And, the argument has now come full circle. It started with the fact of declining liberal
self-identification, a pattern that started at an easily observable time. And now there is an
explanation, that the public images of liberals became associated for many citizens with
pejorative images associated with race, crime, protest, and counter culture. What we know
for now is that many Americans who remain committed to the policies we call liberal
cannot bring themselves to attach the label to their own identities. What the images and
symbols attached to liberal came to be after the 1960s, particularly the framing of the liberal
label, is explored in depth in the next chapter, which attempts to build a complete historical
portrait of liberalism in the U.S.
Concluding Reflections
It is an accepted fact of modern American politics that “liberal,” the word and the
symbols it stands for, are unpopular. Democrats, who are in fact liberal by any reasonable
reading of the evidence, avoid public association with the term (Lukacs 2004). But it is
never lost from usage because Republicans and conservatives are eager to apply it to their
opponents (Craige 1996). “Conservative,” in contrast, is embraced and celebrated. Both
agree that “liberal” is scarred, a label designed to illicit negative images.
If it were simply the case that “liberal” is unpopular because liberalism is unpopular,
then the story would be a simple one. But the governing philosophy we call liberalism,
old age pensions, health care for all, support for workers, regulation of business practices,
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a safety net for the unfortunate, and government measures to create greater equality of
opportunity is in fact widely and regularly approved by American voters. So the story is
not simple at all. The evidence plainly indicates that the electorate on balance dislikes the
symbol, “liberal.” And it plainly indicates that the same electorate likes the substance of
liberalism.27
Somehow the symbol of liberalism has been discredited while the substance, repre-
sented by programs like Social Security and Medicare, has never been more popular. The
historical portrait of how the symbol got separated from the substance has been the moti-
vating problem of this chapter. To unravel that puzzle, evidence of self-identification over
a long span of time was examined, and one particular period in the 1960s was studied. In
that look the decline of self-identified liberals was observed, not gradually and glacially,
as often thought, but all at one period, most of it occurring in only three years. Before the
mid 1960s about 45% of those choosing either a liberal or conservative self-identification
choose liberal. In that period about one fourth all of self-identified liberals disappeared
and never returned, leaving us with the present pattern in which the liberal label is an em-
barrassment to many liberal politicians. The power of elites and the media to control the
environment and thus, the symbols that individuals tie to the ideological terms, was made
clear by this analysis. Liberal’s fall from grace generated an historical question, “what
happened?,” of the first magnitude. An answer has been supplied.
27The conflict between symbolic conservatism of the American electorate and its operational liberalism
has been documented as long ago as Free and Cantril (1967) and is the major theme of Ellis and Stimson
(2012).
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4 ON THE LONGITUDINAL PRESENTATION OF “LIBERAL”
The central focus of the second empirical chapter was determining what symbols, is-
sues, groups, and images became associated with the liberal label in the 1960s. The
answer—softness on crime, race, and support for the rioters—explained how the liberal
identity could become so unpalatable so quickly.
But the story of the 1960s is not the story of today. The symbols of liberal today are
symbols of change, colored by support for marginalized and unpopular groups in American
society. But, we know little empirically about the path from then to now. The years must
be connected if we are to fully understand the longitudinal series of the liberal identity in
the United States. And that is the purpose of this chapter.
I have suggested that the environment, the context, in which citizens form and maintain
their attachments to ideological identities is the second cardinal element to understanding
the condition of the liberal identity in the modern era. So, that is where we shall begin:
developing a longitudinal understanding of the environment. This endeavor will uncover
how the liberal label has been framed, with special attention given to the changing value
foci associated with the liberal identity in American politics.
Framing theory, in other words, carries the heavy load in this chapter. It links the micro
and macro stories of ideological identification. That citizens can alter attachments is clear.
It is up to us to determine how framing has defined the nature of these shits.
Since the 1960s
Before turning in earnest to how the liberal label has been framed since the 1960s, we
need justification that meaning has actually been added to the liberal definition in the minds
of the mass pubic. This notion was given some attention in the previous chapter: a brief
analysis demonstrated more than 50% of Americans did not register an affect for liberals
on the American National Election Study feeling thermometer in the 1960s.
But, there is more work to be done. An additional piece of evidence would provide
further confirmation that the symbols born in the 1960s filled what was once an empty
label: a “before and after” look at feeling thermometer scores, but with a focus on a rarely
studied group, the unsure.
Theoretically, if we saw a big decline in “don’t know” responses after the large decline
in liberal identification, we would know that part of this decline is because liberal took
on new meaning, and an unlucky one at that. Its meaning moved from largely vacancy to
considerable substance. But it would also tell us that something stuck in the 1960s. And if
that level of “don’t know” responses remains low for many years to come, say, until today,
then we have good reason to believe that we know what stuck: the images and symbols tied
to the liberal identity in the 1960s.
Figure 4.1 plots the “don’t know” response percentage from 1964 (the first year data
are available) to the present. In 1964, a full 50.1% of Americans did not feel strongly
enough one way or another to place liberals on the feeling thermometer scale. Throughout
the Sixties, that number declined to 48.5% in 1966 and then down a few more notches
to 43.7% in 1968—evidence of growing meaning that we’ve seen before. But in 1970, a
decided majority of Americans had a feeling for liberals, with only 10.8% of respondents
falling in the don’t know category. That figure—the percentage of Americans without an
affect for liberals—has hovered below 15%, and sometimes much lower, ever since.1
Plotting that same line, the percentage of don’t know responses, alongside liberal iden-
tification in the U.S. yields yet another telling relationship. Figure 4.2 is exactly the same
1The ANES changed its “don’t know” category from a response of “50” meaning “don’t know” to a simply
“don’t know” category. While respondents were clearly instructed to use “50” when they had no real affect
for the target group in 1964, 1966, and 1968, the fact that “50” was also a number on the scale may have
influenced its use. As such, some part of the change in “don’t know” responses is probably due to question
comparability, but surely not all.
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of “Don’t Know” Responses to the Liberal Feeling Thermometer
Prompt, 1964–2008
figure as Figure 4.1, but with liberal identification built in (dotted line) and anchored by the
right y-axis. While the correlation is not perfect, there is correspondence in the movements
of liberal identification and “don’t know responses.” Indeed, a correlation of p = .66 con-
firms what the eye can observe. The first mini series to compare is 1964 to 1966, when both
liberal identification and the percentage of citizens with no real affect for liberals drops—
slightly, but the movement is there. The downward shift for both series continues, until
liberal identity reaches a new low of about 35% in 1970, and don’t know responses hits its
local minimum of 10.75% in that same year. As citizens become more and more confident
78
about how they feel about liberals, that clarity proves more and more deleterious for liberal
identification.
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of “Don’t Know” Responses to the Liberal Feeling Thermometer
Prompt & Liberal Identification, 1964–2008
Moving onto the next dip in liberal identification, the early 1980s, there is a similar
drop in “don’t know” responses for liberal feeling thermometers. From 1982 to 1984, this
percentage dropped by half, from about 14% to about 7%. Meanwhile, liberal identification
dipped slightly, but meaningfully in these same years. And then again in the early to mid
1990s, both series fall off, “don’t know” responses again by half, from about 10% of re-
spondents to about 5% of respondents. Liberal identification falls in step, losing about 11%
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of its adherents in those same years. These contemporaneous shifts lend critical insight:
the more citizens know about liberals, they less likely they are to identify with them.
The Authority of Frames
That “liberal” has taken on meaning is now evident. But what is the nature of this new
meaning? This can be answered by considering how the liberal label has been framed for
the public in a longitudinal sense.
Framing has appeared under other guises for decades within the political science liter-
ature. In an important subset of work, Riker (1980, 1986, 1988, 1996) demonstrated that
political outcomes can be significantly altered if attention can be focused on one aspect of
a debate, for example, rather than another. Carmines and Stimson (1986) likewise demon-
strated how changing perceptions of political parties come about, usually centered around
“critical moments” in which the mass electorate both perceives a difference in an issue po-
sition the parties are taking and cares deeply about the issue (i.e., the issue invokes a strong
emotional response).
Likewise consider the rhetoric of virtually any recent presidential campaign or issue de-
bate. Candidates work to shape the public’s image of their opponents—in 2008, McCain’s
attack ads painted Obama as an elitist professorial type, out of touch with how things work
in Washington. And more recently, Obama consistently portrayed Romney as indecisive,
and far more conservative than the public realized. In each case, the chosen strategy is just
that: strategic. These are all cases of framing, the defining of an issue, group, or figure
along a particular dimension instead of another dimension—a natural part of the political
process (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007).
Issues, people, and groups in society can be viewed from a variety of perspectives,
each giving prominence to a different angle or stressing a different characteristic. Fram-
ing theory rests on the assumption—the widely validated assumption—that these angles
matter. They change the underlying considerations used in individuals’ evaluations of the
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target group, person, or issue (Chong and Druckman 2007). Thus, political elites tend to
spend a great deal of time trying to get people to think about their policies along particular
dimensions.
Psychologically, framing can work in three ways: (1) by making new beliefs available
(e.g., introducing a new way of thinking about a particular issue); (2) by making certain
beliefs more accessible (e.g., repeating the frame); and, (3) by making beliefs applicable or
“strong” in citizens’ evaluations (e.g., encouraging deeper processing of an issue) (Chong
and Druckman 2007). Surprisingly, however, extant literature reveals very little about what
qualifies as a strong or especially effective frame, operating under a “we know it when we
see it” system. What is known, however, is that symbols make particularly strong frames,
most likely because they resonate with preexisting beliefs or knowledge that citizens have
(Chong and Druckman 2007). Take, for example, the symbol of crime that became tightly
associated with the liberal label in the 1960s. Crime was not a foreign concept to citizens,
not an abstract policy proposal. It was, and remains, a visceral and mighty symbol. In
the 1960s, its linkage to the liberal label brought about the largest change in ideological
identification in history.
But the frame could not carry everyone in its tide. Frames have a limit—individual
predispositions like deep-seated values often stand in their way (Chong and Druckman
2007). In the 1960s, tried and true liberals, whose liberal identity was animated by moral
foundations of harm and care and fairness and reciprocity (rather than giving equal weight
to all five foundations) could not envision themselves as conservatives, I believe. The 1960s
was a defining era for liberal identification. While the symbols of 50 years ago may not
explicitly remain today, the lines for what liberal could come to mean in future eras were
drawn.
To understand the magnitude of those framing effects in the 1960s, however, requires
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an over-time analysis as proposed here. Most studies measuring framing focus on imme-
diate impacts or effects at singular time points (e.g., Valentino, Hutchins and White 2002;
Aaroe 2011; Arceneaux 2012). Yet, understanding the durability of effects is more appro-
priate when building a longitudinal understanding of a series like ideological identification.
Such an investigation uncovers when effects endure, fade, or get outweighed (Chong and
Druckman 2010).
Rarely does the framing (or reframing) of an issue, a group, or a candidate completely
overhaul the target. But there are noteworthy exceptions. The reframing of the death
penalty in the United States over the past decade is a strong candidate. By shifting the
frame to one of innocence—that a policy carried out by bureaucrats is prone to waste, inef-
ficiency, and error—opponents of the death penalty have shifted the tide of public opinion
dramatically (Baumgartner, DeBoef and Boydstun 2008). While Americans still support
capital punishment in theory, citizens are increasingly concerned that the system does not
work very well in practice. Indeed, aggregate support for the death penalty has dropped
nearly ten percentage points in the past decade (Baumgartner, et al. 2008). This is serious
movement.
There is much to be learned from this particular case—its lessons are generalizable.
Most basically, it suggests that by understanding how information is presented to citizens
over time, we can make sense of changing tides of public opinion (e.g., Kellstedt 2003),
or, as I will suggest, changing tides of ideological identification. Framing helps outline the
process by which symbols are linked to labels like “liberal” and “conservative.” The micro-
macro connection is clearer when the powerful force of framing is considered because the
individual experience behind system level changes makes sound theoretical sense. Ascer-
taining and measuring frames, and tying them to large-scale changes, is, of course, a highly
nuanced task. There is work to be done.
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Framing in the Real World
Outside the orderly confines of a laboratory, the media—newspapers and television—
are the primary arena for framing to occur (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; McCombs and Shaw
1972). But, as venues, the media have virtues. The media serve as a proxy for public
discourse, an indicator of the nature of public discussion (Baumgartner, et al. 2008). Over-
time analysis of media sources can thus document shifts in the nature of public discourse.
In the previous chapter, a dramatic change of frame produced a dramatic shift in public
discourse, and as a result, a dramatic shift in liberal identification. But, the present task
is different. Now we shall look for more nuanced shifts. But the tipping point, we may
find, was the reframing of the liberal label in the 1960s. Perhaps it’s just been a matter of
reinforcement since then. The data will tell us.
Framing theory contributes heavily to the theoretical premise of this chapter: most ba-
sically that the symbols, images, and issues linked to ideological identifications in the mass
media play a decisive role in determining how citizens evaluate liberals and conservatives
as a group, and thus, the identities citizens ultimately choose. But, a proper longitudinal
framing study is a tall order—too tall for the confines of a dissertation chapter. A bona fide
framing study like Baumgartner, et al. (2008) outlines a set of potential frames (65 unique
arguments across seven dimensions in 3,939 New York Times Index articles in their case)
and traces the use of these frames over time.
There is an alternative to this exhaustive process, one that considers the intuition of
framing theory when the data parameters are much larger (more than 10,000 full length
articles will be evaluated in this chapter). The goal is to uncover how liberal was portrayed
to the mass public through the media. We can get a high quality read on this presentation
by tracing the major symbols and images connected with liberal over time. There is a trade
off to be sure. Baumgartner, et al. (2008) produced the seminal work on the reframing of
the death penalty in the United States. This chapter will do well to be a noteworthy first cut
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at the packaging of the liberal label to the American people.
A Read of the Environment
The question of this chapter is simple: what is the public exposed to? Or more di-
rectly, what has the public been exposed to in relation to “liberal”? It is sensible to start
this longitudinal investigation with a source that spans the full time series of ideological
identification: news print. The assumption is that newspapers are a reasonable and dispas-
sionate indicator of the themes associated with “liberal,” a safe assumption, I believe. Not
only is the purpose of high quality journalism to report news in a factual sense, this also
often includes reporting directly the commentary of elites. Thus, the benefit of newspapers
as a source is twofold: they give a factual report of the environment and a review of elite
rhetoric, precisely what the theory requests.
A healthy sum of scholars have both used and validated The New York Times as the
nation’s leading newspaper, but not simply because it is the most widely circulated among
its peers. When The Times covers a topic, so do other widely circulated and regional sources
(Althaus, Edy and Phalen 2001; Baumgartner, DeBoef and Boydstun 2008; Soroka 2002;
Woolley 2000). The New York Times Historical database is also one of the few sources
that covers the entire span necessary for investigating a lengthy time series like the one
under consideration here: the series of ideological identification, 1960-2000. It is thus a
welcomed finding that The Times is also the single best indicator of public discourse.
Time Series Analysis of The New York Times
Turning now to The New York Times, the task is to search for the themes, symbols,
and images that are most tightly associated with the liberal label over time. To do this, I
began by conducting an exhaustive search for all front page articles from 1960—2000 that
mention “liberal.”2 These articles were then downloaded and converted into text format for
2Data from 1960—2000 are available and downloaded from a single source, ProQuest. After 2000, data
must be collected from a different source, which compromises comparability in the conversion from down-
loaded file to readable file.
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easier readability.
An Avenue for Evaluation
There are, of course multiple avenues for analyzing this vast dataset. The central goal is
understanding how “liberal” is framed for public consumption. I have posited throughout
this dissertation that the moral foundations of liberals and conservatives, these moral prin-
ciples that guide how citizens evaluate symbols and groups (e.g., ideological groups) are
different—and that these differences matter. They help explain why liberals and conserva-
tives have such difficulty understanding the positions of the other side (Graham, Haidt and
Nosek 2009). This is a potential angle.
Generally speaking, liberals endorse only two of the five moral foundations: harm/care
and fairness/reciprocity, those that cause citizens to disapprove of those who cause pain
and suffering, approve of those who alleviate harm, and also constitute citizens’ sensi-
tivity levels to equality and justice and those who violate these principles (Koleva, Gra-
ham, Iyer, Ditto and Haidt 2012). Conservatives, in the diction of Haidt (2012), have
“broader cuisines” and make use of all five elements, but the most striking differences
between liberals and conservatives involve the final three dimensions of in-group/loyalty,
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Koleva, et al. 2012). These three relate to indi-
viduals’ attachments to groups, tendencies to create hierarchically structured societies of
dominance and subordination, favorability for obedience, and disgust sensitivity to vari-
ous social contaminants (Koleva, et al. 2012). Critical in the moral foundations structure
and findings is that liberals view these latter three foundations significantly less relevant
in deciding whether things are right or wrong. Liberals are, at best, ambivalent to these
foundations (Haidt 2012). In fact, liberals often go so far as to violate the other three foun-
dations in their moral decisions and affections to ensure the protection of harm/care and
fairness/reciprocity foundations (Haidt 2012).
Considering the framing of the liberal label through the lens of moral foundations
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rhetoric lends a unique perspective. It grants the ability to step back from specific political
or social issues and determine if there is a moral undercurrent in the way that “liberal” is
framed for the American public. And if so, perhaps this undercurrent has contributed to
persistent deflated levels of liberal identification—above and beyond any particular issues.
Lakoff (2002) has demonstrated that liberals and conservatives use different sets of
words to create frames that make policies seem overall morally “good” or morally “bad.”
Words, that is, do the work of politics (Luntz 2007). Language used by elites and the me-
dia to frame “liberal” shapes how citizens evaluate liberals as a group; words are full of
symbolic meaning. And symbols make particularly strong framing devices (Chong and
Druckman 2007). Theoretically, then, there is good reason to expect that if the liberal label
is framed in a manner consistent with those foundations that appeal to liberals (harm/care
and fairness/reciprocity), this should positively affect liberal identification. This connec-
tion between individuals’ chosen ideological label and morally appealing language should
enhance the self-image liberals have of their ideological group, and draw in those who also
have the dispositional and moral foundation principles that lean in the liberal direction.
Quite simply, moral language and symbols that appeal to liberal individuals paired with
stories that mention liberal itself is a force that has the capacity to positively affect liberal
identification.
The force works both ways, however. Because liberals are ambivalent to the language of
in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity foundations, its use in conjunction
with the liberal label will do very little to enhance liberals’ self-images or attract liberal
leaners. Liberals will be largely unaffected by this language—it simply does not appeal to
their moral foundations.
But, might it attract “natural conservatives”? There is no reason to believe, for exam-
ple, that liberals and conservatives are any differently affected by the use of moral language.
So, if the liberal label is being framed with moral language that appeals to conservatives, it
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stands to reason that conservatives may be drawn to the liberal identity. Yet, this possibility
rests on a critical nuance: that the connection between the conservative-appealing moral
language and “liberal” is positive. That is, for this connection to have the ability to attract
conservatives, “liberal” would have to be seen as promoting in-groups, authority, hierarchy,
or tradition. If “liberal” is seen as undermining these conservative-appealing foundations,
conservatives would, of course, not be drawn to the liberal identity. In fact, this undermin-
ing would likely serve to enhance conservatives’ views of their chosen identities because it
would highlight that liberals are unsupportive of these moral foundations.
Thinking back to the model of ideological identification from the first empirical chap-
ter, moral foundations are a component of the dispositions that shape citizens’ ideological
identifications (see Figure 4.3). Framing is environmental. But framing in the moral foun-
dations sense links the two—the use of this language appeals to citizens’ predispositions,
making it even more powerful frame. In Chong and Druckman’s (2007) conception, using
moral foundations rhetoric as a framing device works by making already present beliefs
more applicable and more strong. Thus, framing ideological terms in moral foundations
language affects the symbols and images linked to ideological labels. This, in turn, shapes
the way citizens evaluate “liberal” and “conservative.” And it is these evaluations that drive
ideological identifications themselves (Conover and Feldman 1981).
This investigation thus has the potential to lend new leverage on explaining association
with the liberal identity. If the moral foundations principles associated with “liberal” have
been consistently less appealing to liberal citizens, understanding why liberal identification
is and has long been a two-to-one underdog to conservative identification is considerably
more straightforward. That is, if “liberal” is largely void of ties to harm/care and fair-
ness/reciprocity foundations (or is strongly overpowered by the other three foundations),
then liberals in the mass public are left with little positive reinforcement. Coupling this with
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Figure 4.3: Model of Ideological Identification Formation, Considering Moral Foundations
Theory
the fact that few elites outwardly identify as “liberal,” as discussed in the previous chap-
ter, liberal citizens not only have very limited leadership, they would also lack exposure to
morally-reinforcing symbols in the media.
The second potential source of leverage is more temporal, and certainly a more stren-
uous test of the theory. The ideological map of the American citizenry has changed at the
margins since the major shift in the 1960s. But, there are shifts to be sure. Should these
shifts coincide with the changing dialogue of moral foundations symbols, then we have un-
covered something truly novel about ideological identification in the U.S.: that it is affected
by and responds to the moral foundations framing of political elites and the media.
Design
As a first cut at evaluating this sizable dataset, I trace the usage of the five moral founda-
tions “language” in articles mentioning “liberal” to assess the media’s framing of the liberal
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label. I search for the number of times each one of the five moral foundations are used in
stories mentioning “liberal” from 1960—2000 using the moral foundations dictionary de-
veloped by Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009).3 Quantitative content analysis of texts, such
as the method employed here, is considered to be the most objective approach to analyz-
ing linguistic data (Silverman 1993). This dictionary consists of multiple synonyms for
each of the foundations such that the full meaning of the moral dimension is captured. For
example, the harm/care dictionary includes 51 words that connote harm and care, such as
“peace,” “compassion”, “protect,” “fight,” “war,” and “kill,” while purity/sanctity principles
are captured by considering the use of words like “holiness,” “sin,” “disgust,” “adultery,”
and “clean.”4
To be clear, the present analysis is silent on valence, the positivity or negativity, tied to
the moral foundations language. For now, the assumption I am making about the framing of
the moral foundations language is that when the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity frames
are employed, the frames are positive in relation to the liberal label. Conversely, when
less appealing frames are used in conjunction with “liberal,” I am assuming these are nega-
tive in tone. As a result, the overall presentation of the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect,
and purity/sanctity frames as tied to “liberal” would simultaneously be less appealing to
liberals and reinforce conservatives’ moral attachment to the conservative identity. To pro-
vide some validity to this assumption, I hand-coded a set of 50 stories from 1980s, ten
randomly chosen from each moral foundation. The results largely comply with my as-
sumptions, as the following examples demonstrate. In an August 12, 1980 article centered
on Jimmy Carter’s platforms for reelection, The Times quotes Carter as saying “The issue
we are debating is one of fairness” (fairness/reciprocity foundation; emphasis added). An
3I am especially grateful to Mindy White for writing the Python code to evaluate the articles using this
method.
4Number of synonyms for remaining three foundations: fairness/reciprocity n=44, in-group/loyalty
n=50, authority/respect n=70, purity/sanctity n=80. Also, see Appendix for full Moral Foundations Dic-
tionary.
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October 3, 1980 story, detailing the Republican platform of Ronald Reagan notes he would
appoint judges who “respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human
life” (purity/sanctity foundation; emphasis added). After winning the 1980 presidential
election, The Times published a story on Reagan’s new “brain trust,” with particular focus
on a member of his foreign policy task force and prominent figure in the presidential tran-
sition, Dr. Kirkpatrick. In explaining her alienation from the “liberal Democratic Party,”
she notes the rise of the counterculture and anti-war movement, and claims that “the en-
emy is them. Purveyors of unfreedom. Freedom is our central value” (December 1, 1980;
in-group/loyalty foundation; emphasis added). Referring to the difficulty in finding a job
during the recession, a conservative college placement director noted that “lack of respect
for the work ethic may be the single biggest deterrent to getting a job” (June 17, 1980;
authority/respect foundation; emphasis added). Finally, President Carter, in an attempt to
contrast himself from then-candidate Reagan “offered himself as a President with the ex-
perience to know that there are ‘no easy answers’ and to understand that the Presidency is
‘a place of compassion’” (August 15, 1980; harm/care foundation; emphasis added).
What the Data Show
Figure 4.4 plots the frequencies of two condensed types of language in the front page
The New York Times stories mentioning “liberal” from 1960—2000: language appealing
to liberals (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity dimensions) and language less appealing or
relevant to liberals (in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity dimensions).
Gray bars represent the use of language less appealing to liberals, and the black bars
represent the frequency language that does appeal to liberals. Considerable variation exists
in these two types of language over the time series, a clear indication that there are observ-
able shifts in the nature of public discourse as it relates to moral foundations symbols and
language. But there is also noteworthy variation within years, between the two types of
language. In 1960, for example, harm/care and fairness/reciprocity language is used less
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Figure 4.4: Frequencies of Use of Moral Foundations Language in Front Page Articles of
The New York Times, 1960—2000.
than half as much as its counterpart. This divide is substantial throughout the 1960s, when
less appealing or less relevant language outweighs liberal moral foundations language by a
margin of 2:1 in nearly every year. This pattern continues throughout the 1970s, although
to a lesser extent. At most points in the 1980s, liberal appealing language is decidedly
outdone by less appealing language. By the 1990s, however, the tide shifts, with morally
liberal-appealing language and symbols almost matching its counterpart. Indeed the 1990s
boasts the only year (1997) that liberal appealing language wins out.
Beginning with the more general hypothesis suggested above: do the media, on average,
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frame liberals in terms of the moral foundations symbols that appeal to liberals? Figure 4.5
helps gain some ground on answering this question. The short answer is no, and not by
a long shot. Figure 4.5 is constructed by subtracting the less appealing language (gray
bars in Figure 4.4) from the appealing language (black bars in Figure 4.4) for each year.
The figure reveals a stark pattern: less appealing and less relevant language overpowers
appealing language in all but one year (1997) in a 40 year series.
A closer look back at Figure 4.4 also reveals a few noticeable patterns: the first is that in
the 1960s, less appealing language grows significantly, reaching its second highest level in
1966. This year, of course, is a pivotal year in the large decline of liberal identifiers. In 1967
and 1968, the other two years that make up the sharp movements in liberal identification,
the margin by which less relevant language outweighs appealing language is its highest in
the entire series (Figure 4.5).
So, moral foundations language in stories mentioning “liberal” generally lacks liberal
appeal. Moral frames that specifically lack appeal to liberals are used much more often—
again, overpowering the tenor of language in all but one year in the entire series of media
coverage. This is strong evidence in support of the first, more general hypothesis, that
considers the overall portrait of the presentation of “liberal” to the public. Results strongly
support the notion that the media frames the liberal label in a fashion that is unlikely to
attract liberals themselves.
While the lack of parity between the two types of language is striking, moral foundation
theory suggests that liberals are really only sensitive to harm/care and fairness/reciprocity
language. Appeals to the other three foundations are mostly irrelevant to liberals. Looking
now to Figure 4.6, this assertion is put to the test. The gray bars represent the count of
the use of liberal-appealing moral foundations language in front page The New York Times
stories that also mention “liberal.” The black line is a familiar series: liberal identification.
There is some relationship evident from the figure, but the empirical test is correlation.
92
1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996
Year
<-
-L
ess
 A
pp
ea
lin
g t
o L
ibe
ral
s; 
M
ore
 A
pp
ea
lin
g t
o L
ibe
ral
s--
>
-20
0
-10
0
0
10
0
20
0
Figure 4.5: Net of Moral Foundations Language in Front Page The New York Times Stories
Mentioning “Liberal” (calculated by subtracting “less appealing” language from “appeal-
ing” language)
The correlation between the two series is p = .15, hardly an overwhelming finding. But,
it is in the proper expected direction: as those morally relevant symbols and language are
used more and more in relation to “liberal”, liberal identification itself increases. Given
this connection is measured over a 40 year period, there is at least modest evidence that
the manner in which the media frames the “liberal,” this central component of political
discourse, shapes the way citizens think about their ideological identities, and thus, how
they identify.
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Liberal Identification
An Alternative Avenue
Another potential avenue for exploring the framing of the liberal label is taking seri-
ously the inconsistency between those moral frames that appeal to liberals and those that
are less relevant. It may be that the extent to which “liberal” is not framed in an appeal-
ing manner matters for liberal identification. Perhaps, that is, the lack of positive framing
has an effect on the ideological identification choices of citizens. While the principles of
in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity may be significantly less relevant
to liberals, the use of this moral language is still significantly overpowering that language
94
which does appeal to liberals. This is a testable idea. The empirical question is similar
to the previous one: do these documented shifts in the nature of public discourse affect
association with the liberal identity?
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Times Stories Mentioning “Liberal” (constructed by subtracting “appealing” language from
“less appealing” language) & Liberal Identification, 1960-2000
Figure 4.7 plots the net difference in language with liberal identification. Net difference
in this configuration is the reverse of Figure 4.5 so that the liberal identification series can
be plotted on the same plane. Here it is the number of liberal-appealing articles subtracted
from the number of less appealing articles, by year. Gray bars represent the margin by
which the media framing of “liberal” is less relevant to liberal moral foundations—the
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degree to which these frames overpower liberal-appealing frames. The higher the bars, the
less relevant the language is to liberals. Liberal identification is again the black line.
Again, the empirical test is correlation. For this analysis, I allow for potentially impor-
tant period effects by correlating the series by decade. The results, the margin by which
the value of liberal-appealing language is dominated by less relevant language with liberal
identification, is presented in Table 4.1. Throughout three decades of American history,
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the media’s framing of the liberal label has a marked effect
liberal identification. Results are less compelling for the 1990s, when the connection be-
tween the media’s moral foundations framing of “liberal” has no real significant effect on
liberal identification. With the exception of one year (1994), the use of these two types of
languages is quite balanced throughout the 1990s, evidenced by the smaller gray bars in
Figure 4.7 compared to other decades. Without variance, moral foundations language can
do little by way of affecting ideological identifications.
By and large, however, as language is dominated by rhetoric less relevant to liberals,
liberal identification loses ground. This is a decidedly more surprising finding, given that
these frames should be of little importance to liberals. Yet, the degree to which they over-
power more appealing frames is clearly a meaningful and powerful force. This finding
reinforces the notion that the manner in which the media frames “liberal” matters for un-
derstanding liberal ideological identification.
Table 4.1: Correlation of Effects of Media Framing of “Liberal” & Liberal Identification
Decade Correlation
1960-1969 – .41
1970-1979 – .41
1980-1989 – .60
1990-1999 .02
Liberal citizens, these analyses demonstrate, are exposed to framing of the liberal label
that they find, by and large, unmoving. The moral symbols and language they find most
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appealing is largely overwhelmed by less relevant moral language or flatly missing from
the media’s framing of their chosen ideological identities.
Next Steps
In this chapter, I have attempted to begin the first critical steps in building a longitudinal
understanding of liberal identification in the U.S. By focusing on the moral foundations
rhetoric and symbols associated with the liberal identity in the mass media, I have linked a
key element of the micro-level psychological theory of identity formation and maintenance
to the broader, macro level of the environment.
In future research, I plan to look more closely at moral foundations rhetoric evalu-
ated in this chapter. In particular, I will extend my consideration of the context (positivity
and negativity) of the use of the moral frames. This coding judge for each moral word
identified, whether or not it was positively or negatively associated with “liberal.” That is,
does the association with “liberal” endorse the liberal label or not? This extension may lend
crucial insight, for example, in explaining why the correlations between harm/care and fair-
ness/reciprocity foundations are not more strongly associated with liberal identification. If
these frames are connected with the liberal label in a negative fashion, this underwhelming
result makes considerably more sense. This valence coding may also aid interpretation of
why the use of the less relevant frames has a marked effect on liberal identification.
I also intend to move beyond the moral foundations lens, and develop a “Political Sym-
bols Dictionary” that mirrors the societal and political groups of the American National
Election Study’s feeling thermometer measures. Joining these two sources together will
provide a method for tracking the groups associated with liberal alongside the changing
affects citizens hold for these political and societal groups. Such analyses lend the ability
to link the liberal label with its changing symbolic meaning using a different avenue.
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5 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In three parts, this dissertation has endeavored to make a significant and meaningful
contribution to the study of ideological identification in the U.S. I have focused especially
on the liberal identity, a central component of American political and social rhetoric that has
often eluded political scientists. While studies have certainly evaluated significant elements
of the series of ideological identification—both at the macro and micro level—they are
silent on the more complete, longitudinal series, especially the liberal identification. Data
limitations, for example, have thus far prevented acknowledgment of the dramatic shift in
liberal identification in the 1960s, which I am able to overcome because of the recent work
of others (Ellis and Stimson 2012). Prior to this data availability, most modern ideological
studies simply accepted as fact the deflated levels of liberal identification. My study has
attempted to provide deeper historical context of the origins of present conditions.
I began by building a framework for ideological identification formation and mainte-
nance, drawing from multiple theories that, when considered together, constitute a more
complete model of how these identities are formed, and how and why they can (and do)
change. My model suggests that two major forces, psychological predispositions and en-
vironmental factors, are the central components of citizens’ ideological identifications. In-
nate personality features and characteristic adaptations like moral foundations (e.g., Haidt
2012) largely dictate the way in which individuals interpret and interact with their envi-
ronments. In essence, individuals are psychologically prepared to adopt certain attitudes
(like ideological identifications) over others (Jost and Sulloway 2003; Jost 2006; Jost and
Gosling 2008). Contrasting affinities toward stability versus change, and the related pull be-
tween hierarchy—which typically supports stability—and equality—which typically man-
dates change—captures a critical facet of the liberal-conservative pattern. And, moral in-
tuitions take the dispositional understanding of ideological identifications one step further:
extant literature demonstrates they are a powerful mechanism underlying these identities as
well (Haidt and Graham 2007; Haidt, Graham and Joseph 2009; Graham, Haidt and Nosek
2009; Graham and Haidt n.d.; Haidt 2012). But the environment—political elites and the
media—is itself a powerful agency, for it controls what symbols, images, and rhetoric in-
dividuals encounter. In essence, it controls to what individuals respond. Taking these two
elements together, the first empirical chapter organized the model of ideological identifica-
tion that informed the second and third empirical chapters.
In both the second and third empirical chapters, I demonstrated this robust power of
the environment. The second empirical chapter took on a case study of sorts, zeroing in
on the 1960s, tracing the decline in liberal identitification, the largest shift in ideological
identification to date. What I discovered was that the liberal bundle became one of crime,
race, and rioting, in large part a product of media presentation. Both The New York Times
and Newsweek lent compelling evidence of this notion. Race, crime, rioting—and liberal—
became inextricably linked in the rhetoric of conservative elites and in media coverage
throughout the 1960s. Liberal elites, since the 1960s, have ceased to label themselves or
their policies “liberal.” Further, ANES correlational data provided strong evidence that the
mass public recognized these connections born in the 1960s, tightly associating liberals
with racialized groups beginning in the 1960s, correlations that grew throughout the 1960s
and continued to last into later decades. Indeed, “liberal” remains racialized today, one
key finding that helps explain the central puzzle of this dissertation: why liberal policy
programs and liberal politicians remain popular despite the unpopularity of the liberal label
itself.
99
The third empirical chapter linked together the 1960s with the modern day, testing the
longitudinal power of moral foundations rhetoric on the framing of the liberal label. Moral
Foundations Theory (e.g., Haidt 2012), while a major force in the larger field of psychol-
ogy, has made little inroads thus far in empirical studies of political science. But, given the
considerable role that predispositions play in informing ideological identifications, moral
intuitions cannot be ignored, especially in light of the evidence presented in the third em-
pirical chapter. The message was unmistakable: since the 1960s, elite rhetoric and the
media have consistently framed “liberal” with moral symbols less appealing to liberals
themselves. This finding contributes another critical piece in explaining the consistent
levels of deflated liberal identification. Moral foundation theory suggested that, in order
to understand why “liberal” is far less preferred to the conservative label, we must con-
sider the moral palates of individuals. Liberals, on average, endorse exclusively two moral
foundations: harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, while conservatives consider all five moral
domains when making decisions. Evidence from the third empirical chapter offers two cen-
tral insights. First, political elites have long capitalized on the racialized and stigmatized
associations of the liberal identity born out of the 1960s (Chapter 2), and the media has
framed the liberal identity in language that lacks liberal appeal. Second, moral intuitions
inform preferences, and this includes ideological preferences as well, I believe. The very
terms “liberal” and “conservative” connote symbols and images well beyond the political
world (Ellis and Stimson 2012). These connotations play a hefty role in shaping how in-
dividuals identify ideologically. Moral intuitions help make sense of these meanings, and
thus, ideological identities are partly driven by moral intuitions. Without considering this
critical element of citizens’s predispositions, and how they have been morally framed by
the media, it is impossible to understand how the liberal identity became less preferred and
why it remains so. All of this suggests that scholars have been unable to explain “what hap-
pened” to the liberal identity partly because they were looking in the wrong place. Moral
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intuitions are central piece to answering this question.
In addition, the third empirical chapter demonstrated that “liberal,” once a term whose
meaning eluded more than 50% of Americans, has since the late 1960s been full of defi-
nition. The short story is that the more citizens know about liberals, the less they like the
liberal identity. And this finding, along with clear evidence of the racialization of “lib-
eral,” liberal elite abandonment of the label, and the way in which the liberal label has been
morally framed to citizens, builds a final piece of evidence to explain the seemingly eternal
unpopularity of liberal identification in the U.S.
It is my belief that any study that attempts to make a significant contribution to the
understanding of a central part of American politics recognizes its own limitations. My
dissertation is no exception. Along the way, there have been numerous supplemental ideas
and alternative avenues for investigation. I consider what precedes this conclusion to be a
healthy start, but just that: the beginning.
Probably the most obvious area for further analyses is the final chapter. Besides im-
provements already suggested, I also intend to extend the study for the full time series
(1936-2012). My dissertation, necessarily I believe, placed emphasis on a period of par-
ticular disruption in the ideological history of the U.S. As such, the surrounding analysis
focused on how that period came to influence the following years. A complete study of the
series, however, would only enhance our understanding of the shifting tided of ideological
identification.
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A MORAL FOUNDATIONS DICTIONARY
The following sections give the full list of words used in the New York Times search
detailed in Chapter 3. Dash lines (-) indicate a stem word, meaning all variants of that stem
are counted as a mention of that word.
Harm/Care Foundation
safe-, peace-, compassion-, empath-, sympath-, care, caring, protect-, shield, shelter,
amity, secur-, benefit-, defen-, guard, preserve, harm, suffer, war, wars, warl-, warring,
fight, violen-, hurt-, kill, kills, killer-, killed, killing, endanger-, cruel, brutal, abuse-,
damag-, ruin-, ravage, detriment-, crush-, attack-, annihilate-, destroy, stomp, abandon-,
spurn, impair, exploit, exploits, exploited, exploiting, would-.
Fairness/Reciprocity
fair, fairly, fairness, fair-, fairmind, fairplay, equal-, justice, justness, justifi-, reciproc-,
impartial-, egalitar-, rights, equity, evenness, equivalent, unbias-, tolerant, equable, balance-
homologous, unprejudice-, reasonable, constant, honest-, unfair-, unequal-, bias-, unjust-,
injust-, bigot-, descriminat-, disproportion-, inequitable, prejud-, dishonest, unscrupulous,
dissociate, preference, favoritism, segregat-, exclusion, exclud-.
In-Group/Loyalty
together, nation-, homeland-, family, families, familial, group, loyal-, patriot-, commu-
nal, commune-, communit-, communis-, comrad-, cadre, collectiv-, joint, unison, unite-
fellow-, guild, solidarity, devot-, member, cliqu-, cohort, ally, insider, foreign-, enem-
betray-, treason-, traitor-, treacher-, disloyal-, individual-, apostasy, apostate, deserted,
deserter-, deserting, deceiv-, jilt-, imposter, miscreant, spy, sequester, renegade, terroris-
immigra-.
Authority/Respect
obey-, obedien-, duty, law, lawful-, legal-, duti-, honor-, respect, respectful-, respected,
respects, order-, father-, mother, motherl-, mothering, mothers, tradition-, hierarch-, authorit-
permit, permission, status-, rank-, leader-, class, bourgeoisie, caste-, position, complain-
command, supremacy, control, submi-, allegian-, serve, abide, defere-, defer-, revere-
venerat-, comply, defian-, rebel-, dissent-, subver-, disrespect-, disobe-, sediti-, agitat-,
insubordinat-, illegal-, nonconformist, oppose, protest, refuse, denounce, remonstrate, riot-
obstruct.
Purity/Sanctity
piety, pious, purity, pure-, clean-, steril-, sacred-, chast-, holy, holiness, saint-, wholesome-
celiba-, abstention, virgin, virgins, virginity, virginal, austerity, integrity, modesty, abstinen-
abstemiousness, upright, limpid, unadulterated, maiden, virtuous, refined, intemperate,
decen-, immaculate, innocent, pristine, humble, disgust-, deprav-, disease-, unclean-, contagio-
indecen-, sin, sinful-, sinner-, sins, sinned sinning, slut-, whore, dirt-, impiety, impious,
profan-, gross, repuls-, sick-, promiscu-, lewd-, adulter-, debauche-, defile-, tramp, prostiut-
unchaste, wanton, profilgate, filith-, trashy, obscen-, lax, taint-, stain-, tarnish-, debase-,
desecrat-, wicked-, blemish, exploitat-, pervert, wretched-.
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